



Social Engineering: Tales from a Non-Traditional IT Audit

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Agenda

- 1. The Risk: What is Social Engineering
- 2. The Project: UTMB Health's Story
- 3. The Controls: Internal Audit Considerations
- 4. The Trusted Advisor: Internal Audit and Cybersecurity





The Risk





What is Social Engineering?

Phishing and Spear Phishing



Vishing and SMS texting



Baiting and Physical Exploits







What Could Go Wrong?



Employee W2 extracts –
 Seasonal exploit





Wire fraud schemes –
 Executive exploit





What Could Go Wrong?










Data Behind the Risk



- 89% of phishing attacks originate from organized crime syndicates (source: Verizon).
- 95% of all attacks on enterprise networks are the result of spear phishing (source: SANS Institute).
- Phishing will remain the primary method attack delivery through the year 2020 (source: Gartner)





Inherent Risk Exposure?

Target	Level of Susceptibility?
 New Employee 	,
Contractor	?
 Executive and Administrative Assistants 	?
C-Suite	?
■ HR	?
■ Legal	?
 Security Personnel 	?
IT Personnel	?
■ Finance and Accounting	?
Marketing/Communications	?





Risk Scenarios — Threat/Non-Threat?

Social Engineering Technique	Risk Scenario	Risk Exposure*	Level of Effort by Cyber- Criminal
Phishing	Opening a malicious email?	Very Low	Very Low
Phishing	Clicking a malicious link?	Low	Very Low
Phishing / Baiting	Opening a malicious file?	Medium	Very Low
Baiting	Inserting a malicious USB drive?	Medium	Medium
Phishing / Baiting	Running program / executable?	Very High	Very Low
Phishing / Baiting	Running a macro in a malicious file?	Very High	Very Low
Phishing / Baiting / Vishing	User credential theft?	Very High	Very Low
In-Person Exploit	Theft of IT Assets, Sensitive Data	Very High	Medium – Very High







The Project





Engagement Timeline

Tech Talk (Paul Douglas, P&N)

Engagement prep, third party conversations & informal recon begins

Campaigns begin in earnest (advisory engagement)

Reporting completed



Discussed as emerging risk with CIO, ISO, CCO & PO as part of annual risk assessment process Risk based audit approved by IAC as part of proposed FY16 audit work plan Value propositions, vetting third parties, MNDAs, navigating changes within institutional technical controls

Fieldwork completed

Facilitate completion of action plan





Engagement Premise

- Assess the ease of gaining access to buildings, infrastructure, automated information systems, or confidential/sensitive data through methods primarily relying upon human interaction, persuasion or deception (i.e., "a sense of susceptibility, or vulnerability").
- Replicate real world scenarios (both internal and external threats) with varied levels of sophistication and without any notification of testing activities.
- Take reasonable care to do no harm.
- Educational, non-punitive, anecdotal findings.
- Facilitate development of action plan for sustained improvement.
- ...and ultimately get a feel for what it might mean to "operationalize" this type of testing.





Engagement Protocol

- Attorney-Client and attorney work-product privileges.
- Adaptive and opportunistic exploitation.
- All active engagement participants sign non-disclosure agreements.
- IT Audit Manager (or designee) will be notified prior to third parties initiating any potentially invasive campaigns.
- University Police will be notified prior to any physical testing or walkthroughs performed during off-hours.
- Suspected or actual compromised data and/or physical devices will be placed within the protective care of the Privacy Officer.
- University Police will be notified of any physical asset removed from its original location and placed within protective care of the Privacy Officer.
- Any change/compromise in the physical/logical state of an IT asset (not-removed) will be communicated to the Chief Information Officer.
- Any egregious violation of applicable governance will be brought to the immediate attention of Senior VP/General Counsel.
- Provide regular status to Senior VP/General Counsel.





Engagement Stakeholders

Tone from the Top

- Senior VP & General Counsel (sponsor)
- VP & Chief Compliance Officer (owner)
- VP, Legal Affairs
- Police Chief, Assistant Chief, Lt. (Operations/Patrol)
- CAE
- CIO
- ISO
- PIO



From the Bottom Up

- IT Audit Manager (engagement lead)
- IT Auditor (chauffer)
- Privacy Officer (guard rails)
- Web Developers (2)
- Advocate from the trenches
- Helpdesk tickets
- Exchange Engineer
- Advocate from the trenches
- Hall monitor
- Police Technical Manager





Engagement Tactics

- 40+ buildings, 100+ walkabouts
- 150+ baits
- Multiple campus/satellite locations; offices, closets, PCs
- Phishing (e.g., password stringency test, inbox notifications)
- Spear Phishing (e.g., April Fool's Day)
- Vishing (e.g., IT maintenance impersonation)





Engagement Methods

- Assumed identities (persons, domains, websites)
- Reconnaissance ("wandering" the campus)
- Door shimming/bumping & weak passcodes
- Facility intrusion (exterior piggybacking)
- Building walkthroughs (interior penetrations)
- Desktop hacking ("targets of opportunity")
- Data exfiltration (unsecured login sessions)
- OCD tests
- Police encounters
- Baiting
- Pharming (aggressive bait placement)
- Security camera/records retention testing
- "Snatch and Grab"
- Lost & Found procedures
- Dumpster diving
- On-site impersonations
- Phone impersonations
- Password shares



Spoofed domain names & websites

Visitor/Guest management

- Data mining (OSINT publically available)
- Data leakage (PIAs, Intranet)
- Application/User authentication testing
- Vulnerability scans/tests
- Technology patching/configuration testing
- Ransomware susceptibility
- Executive calendar accessibility
- Incident response notifications
- Phishing (enticements)
- Spear phishing (emotional triggers)
- Pretexting (contextual information)
- Vishing (phone version of phishing)
- Whaling (Executive Management)
- Litmus testing ("give me your best shot")
- Cat Phishing (PG13)







Engagement Takeaways

- Internal Audit's relationship with Executive Management says a great deal about your culture.
- At the end of the day layered security defenses are porous and ultimately your employees become your perimeter!
- Employees can be your greatest vulnerability or your best defense against social engineering attacks.
- Everything worthwhile is uphill!





Structuring your Team

• Right balance of internal and external resources.







The Controls





It's more than just phishing...

- Lost and found procedures
- Incident response procedures
- Building entrances
- Building interiors (restricted/secured space)
- Extent of police presence & camera coverage
- Hardcopy (disposal to destruction)
- Desktop configurations (are controls what you expected)
- Non-sanctioned software use
- Vulnerability scans (end user devices)
- Extent of encryption
- Publically displayed login credentials





Related NIST 800-53 Controls

- AT-01 SECURITY AWARENESS AND TRAINING
- IR-01 INCIDENT RESPONSE POLICY AND PROCEDURES
- SC-39 PROCESS ISOLATION
- SC-41 PORT AND I/O DEVICE ACCESS
- SC-44 DETONATION CHAMBERS
- MP-07 MEDIA USE | PROHIBIT USE WITHOUT OWNER
- IA-4 PROHIBIT ACCOUNT IDENTIFIERS AS PUBLIC IDENTIFIERS
- SI-8 SPAM PROTECTION
- SC-7 PREVENT UNAUTHORIZED EXFILTRATION
- AC-19 FULL DEVICE / CONTAINER-BASED ENCRYPTION
- SC-28 PROTECTION OF INFORMATION AT REST






Measuring the Effectiveness of Training











The Trusted Advisor





Adding Value

- As risks continue to evolve, so too must the internal audit function.
- Progressive approaches; different conversations and levels of services.
- Help drive organizational change; reducing the exposure to social engineering threats.
- Provide insights and recommendations on an important risk matter.





The Case for Internal Audit & Cybersecurity

Independent and Objective

Risk Focused

Stronger Mitigation Plan

Control and Operating
Effectiveness

Cybersecurity is Not Just a Point
in Time!





Closing Thoughts



