Contents

Welcome p.2

Conference Programme p.4

Papers
  Keynote Papers p.12
  Abstracts of Parallel, Workshop and Symposium Papers p.34

New College
  Travel Information p.48
  Map of New College p.50
  Telephone Service & Smoking Policy p.52
  New College IT p.54
  Oxford Hotel Information p.56
Welcome

Dear Colleagues,

We meet this year from Friday 28 March until Sunday 30 March 2014 in the lovely surroundings of New College, Oxford. On behalf of the PESGB I extend a warm welcome to all delegates. This year, New College is undergoing some essential building work. Whilst every effort is being made to minimise disruption, please note that some rooms may have restricted views and there will be some temporary buildings erected. No noise disturbance is expected during the conference.

The conference is intended to be a forum for the discussion of ideas and it is hoped that delegates will take the opportunity to read the papers they wish to attend in advance. Presenters are therefore asked to avoid reading their papers; instead it is expected that they will summarise their argument as a springboard for discussion.

Presenters of a paper should aim to speak for 15 - 20 minutes; symposia should comprise no more than a total of 40 minutes’ presentation by all contributors; a workshop presentation should take no more than 10 minutes to outline an issue as a springboard for discussion. For these reasons and in the interests of mutual courtesy we ask, and expect, our session Chairs to hold colleagues to time.

Papers are made available on the CD-ROM that accompanies this booklet and are also presented on the Society’s website at www.philosophy-of-education.org. It is hoped that delegates will take the opportunity to read the papers they wish to attend in advance of the conference. Delegates are invited to download the papers they wish to attend. This booklet contains abstracts of the parallel sessions to assist you in deciding what to download, as well as the text of some of the plenary papers. The plenary papers are also available on the website. If you experience difficulties downloading papers from the website, please contact our administrators at pesgb@sasevents.co.uk. A very few hard copies will be available at the conference for those who have been unable to access them in other ways.

Information to note:

- We have made a few changes to the programme, such as moving the AGM to an earlier time on Saturday and an additional session for early career researchers; please check the agenda in your conference bag with care.

- 2015 will be the 50th anniversary of the PESGB. Various celebratory activities have been planned. We are holding an open meeting on Saturday after dinner to share ideas with delegates and to harness your views and suggestions to make this a very special anniversary year. Also look out for previews of the new website, due for launch in the summer.

- To manage last-minute changes, information about the location of sessions will be provided on registration. Details can be found on the programme in your conference bag and displayed in the Conference Office.

- Please see the information concerning the Called Poster Session and the Pre-conference Student Workshop.

- Please bring an ethernet cable if you require internet access in your room. Mac users are also advised to bring any additional requisite cables.

The Society continues to subsidise the conference, providing generous support to full-time students, the unwaged, part-time academics and practising teachers. For compiling the programme and managing the blind review process, thanks are due to Morwenna Griffiths,
Conference Chair, and to all members of the Conference Paper Review Panel and the Conference Committee.

We hope that you will find attendance at the conference to be thoroughly worthwhile and we thank you for your continued support of the society.

Carrie Winstanley
C.Winstanley@Roehampton.ac.uk
Conference Organiser
Conference Programme 2014

FRIDAY 28 MARCH

13.00 Pre-conference Workshop for Graduate Students
(Please note: you must be a student to attend this workshop and you will need
 to register in advance. There is no additional charge.)
The Convention on the Rights of the Child by the General Assembly of the
United Nations
[Christopher Cox]

14.00 Conference Registration open

15.15 WILEY PRESENTATION
‘A beginner’s guide to getting published in journals’
Rebecca Launchbury, Wiley and Bob Davis, JOPE Editor

15.45 Tea
[TBC]

CALLED POSTER SESSION - open to all
Authors of called posters will be available to discuss their work
[Junior Common Room]

On the Role of Perception in Practical Reasoning: Some Implications of the
McDowell-Dreyfus Debate for Moral Education
HIROTAKA SUGITA

Can education change the human condition and build social justice
LAURA SELMO

History textbook revisions and narrative refiguration - Ricoeur's Pedagogy of
Pardon as a narrative road to peace
BRITMARIE HOVLAND

Subjectivity, post-humanism and the possibility of Bildung
KATIE GUINNANE

Education for Deliberative Democracy: A literature Review
MARTIN SAMUELSSON

16.45 Invited Speaker
[Holywell Music Room]

Epistemic injustice
Miranda Fricker

Chair: Morwenna Griffiths
Respondent: Michael Hand

18.15 Drinks Reception
[Founder’s Library]

19.00 Wiley Conference Dinner
Our continuing thanks to Wiley for sponsoring this evening’s dinner

20.15-21.45 PARALLEL SESSIONS I

A Chair: Atli Harðarson

Freedoms, danger, principles: academy schools in England
RUTH HEILBRÖNN

Moral education and the common school: building on Wilson’s ‘New Introduction’
RICHARD DAVIES

B (SYMPOSIUM)
Chair: Naomi Hodgson

Philosophy, Literature, and Education
RICHARD SMITH, JAMES CONROY, BOB DAVIS, LIAM GEARON, SHARON TODD

C Chair: Alin Olteanu

Dialogical Teaching and the Varieties of Telling
GRAHAM NUTBROWN

Aporia, Revelation and the Socratic Method: What Contemporary Educators Can Learn from Plato’s Lysis
MARK E JONAS

D Chair: Anniina Leiviskä

Serious Words for Serious Subjects
ADRIAN SKILBECK

Education and Political Sacrifice
IDO GIDEON

E (WORKSHOPS)
Chair: Stefaan Cuypers

Critical conversations in Philosophy of Education Seminar Series
ANDREW DAVIS

The best laid schemes
TONJE KVERNBEKK

F Chair: Kristján Kristjánsson

On the idea that education should help us come to terms with life’s ultimate pointlessness
ANDERS SCHINKEL

The Aims of Education and the Leap of Freedom
SUNINN YUN

21.45 Bar open
SATURDAY 29 MARCH

08.00  Breakfast

09.00-10.30  PARALLEL SESSIONS II

A  Chair: Douglas Yacek

In Excess of Epistemology: Siegel, Taylor, Heidegger and the Conditions of Thought
EMMA WILLIAMS

Knowledge and the Space of Reasons
GEOFFREY HINCHLIFFE

B  Chair: John White

Teaching by example. What it means for teachers to be role models
WOUTER SANDERSE

Implications of Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy for Learning and Teaching
IAN CANTLEY

C  Chair: Harvey Siegel

The Right to Vote and the Duty to Educate Oneself
STEINAR BØYUM

Citizenship, work and the idea of the university
NATALIA SÁNCHÉZ, ANDRÉS MEJÍA

D  Chair: Graham Nutbrown

Critical thinking and self-knowledge
FREDY HERNÁN PRIETO GALINDO

Behold: Silence and Attention in Education
DAVID LEWIN

E  (SYMPOSIUM)
Chair: Judith Suissa

Panel Presentation: Education in a Post-Metaphysical World: Reflections on Christopher Martin’s Program of a Shared, Public Understanding of Education
KRASSIMIR STOJANOV, CHRISTOPHER MARTIN, JOHNSTON JAMES SCOTT, OKSHEVSKI WALTER

F  (SYMPOSIUM)
Chair: Viktor Johansson

Emerson and Bildung: Self-Cultivation, Social Critique, Democracy
CLAUDIA SCHUMANN, HEIKKI KOVALAINEN, NAOKO SAITO, PAUL STANDISH

10.30  Coffee
11.00

Invited Speaker
[Holywell Music Room]

Title: Educating Capitalists: Constructive Practice in the Face of Liquid Fear
BARBARA STENGEL

Chair: Richard Smith
Respondent: Yusef Waghid

13.00

Lunch

15.30-17.00 PARALLEL SESSIONS III

A
Chair: Tone Kvernbekk

The Gadamer-Habermas debate and the concepts of tradition and authority in the philosophy of education
ANNIINA LEIVISKÄ

The Wisdom of Clichés: Liberal Learning and the Burden of Originality
KEVIN GARY

B
Chair: Ruth Heilbronn

On the justification of physical education: Body-based mindfulness and R.S. Peters’ cognitive criteria
OREN ERGAS, CHRISTOPHER MARTIN

Locke on education for liberty and rational self-control
ATLI HARDARSON

C
Chair: Anders Schinkel

Learning as the passage from icon to argument and why do students have teachers (or learning as falling love)
ALIN OLTEANU

Open Access publication: some notes on visibility and making public
NAOMI HODGSON

D (SYMPOSIUM)
Chair: Ruth Wareham

Beyond the Prism - Reflections on Cosmopolitanism in Education
ELI VINOKUR, CLAUDIA SCHUMANN, YUZO HIROSE

E
Chair: Andrew Davis

“What The Papers Say ….” Hierarchies of Symbolism and their Consequences for the Teaching of Reading
HARRIET PATTISON

John White's Radically Practical Conception of Educational Philosophy: An Assessment
STEFAAN CUYPERS
17.00   Tea
17.30-19.00 Annual General Meeting of the Society
                          [Chris Cox Room]
19.30   Conference Dinner
21.00   PESGB@50. Conference 2015 Meeting
SUNDAY 30 MARCH

08.30  Breakfast

09.30–11.00  PARALLEL SESSIONS V

A  Chair:  David Lewin

Art and Moral Understanding
ROGER MARPLES

The ‘New Synthesis in Moral Psychology’ versus Aristotelianism: Implications for Moral Education
KRISTJAN KRISTJANSSON

B  Chair:  Geoff Hinchliffe

Examining examining
JOHN WHITE

The Trouble with Assessment for Accountability
GERARD LUM

C  Chair:  David Aldridge

Learning to See with Different Eyes: Nietzsche on the Pedagogy of Perspectival Empathy
DOUGLAS YACEK

Adorno and Cultural Education for Love and Resistance
SHARON JESSOP

D  (SYMPOSIUM)

Chair:  David Bakhurst

"Bildung, the Space of Reasons, and the Educational Aim of Autonomy"
HARVEY SIEGEL, MICHAEL HAND, PAUL STANDISH

E  (WORKSHOPS)

Chair:  Adrian Skilbeck

Reconstituting an ethics of care and its implications for critical pedagogy
YUSEF WAGHID

Educational Responses to Religious Pluralism: Reasonable Accommodation and the Charter of Quebec Values
RYAN BEVAN, MICHAEL SCHAPIRA

The family as "gathering": re-visiting the pedagogical dimension of parenting in view of the socio-material turn
PHILIPPE NOENS

11.00  Coffee
11.30  Invited Symposium
[Holywell Music Room]

Chair: Janet Orchard

Teachers’ Professional Knowledge
TOM HAMILTON, General Teaching Council of Scotland
PADRAIG HOGAN, National University of Ireland, Maynooth
ALIS OANCEA, University of Oxford

13.00  Lunch
Keynote Papers
(invited speakers)

Teachers’ Professional Knowledge: A View from Scotland

Tom Hamilton

Introduction

The General Teaching Council for Scotland (GTCS) is the independent professional statutory regulatory body for teachers in Scotland. Set up in 1965 as a non-departmental public body, in 2012 its designation was changed and it became independent.

Amongst its general functions are to:

- keep a register of teachers;
- establish and review the standards of education and training appropriate to school teachers;
- establish and review the standards of conduct and professional competence expected of a registered teacher;
- maintain a scheme of Professional Update for teachers.

The GTCS determines what constitutes a Teaching Qualification (TQ) in Scotland and sets the requirements for all initial teacher education (ITE) programmes leading to a TQ. It also sets the Professional Standards for teachers in Scotland with the following currently in place:

- Standards for Registration: Provisional Registration (end of ITE) and Full Registration (end of probation period and thereafter the baseline Standard for competence);
- Standard for Career-Long Professional Learning;
- Standards for Leadership and Management: Middle Leadership and Headship.

The Standards for Registration are mandatory requirements which must be achieved by all teachers. Reflection against the Standard for Career-Long Professional Learning is an option for classroom teachers as they move throughout their careers and builds on work the GTCS has completed on accomplished teaching and professional enquiry. The Standards for Leadership and Management are for those teachers following a promoted post route.

(All of the Standards along with various support materials can be found at: http://www.gtcs.org.uk/standards/standards.aspx)

The GTCS model of the teacher

GTC Scotland would argue that being a teacher is a complex and multi-faceted role. In its submission to the Review of Teacher Education in Scotland completed by Graham Donaldson, which led to the publication of Teaching Scotland’s Future (Scottish Government 2011), it suggested that new teachers needed to:

- have values and ethics,
- be reflective and innovative,
- be experts in pedagogy,
- be agents of change rather than recipients of it,
- be autonomous while recognising their place within systems,
- have commitment, resilience and high levels of self-efficacy,
- have appropriate subject content and pedagogic content knowledge,
be accountable and consider the impact of their teaching on pupils and learners,
know about research and scholarship and where appropriate actively practise research,
be committed to their own ongoing professional development,
be aware of education’s links to other fields,
be committed to working with other professionals within and beyond education.

In *Teaching Scotland’s Future* (op cit) Donaldson then stated:

Teaching has never been the kind of straightforward task which an external observer might perceive it to be. It is both complex and challenging and the twenty-first century demands which teachers already face on a daily basis require the highest standards of professional competence and commitment. It may be tempting and superficially efficient to address the needs of teachers through external prescription, pre-packaged materials and specific training. However, long-term and sustained improvement which has a real impact on the quality of children’s learning will be better achieved through determined efforts to build the capacity of teachers themselves to take responsibility for their own professional development, building their pedagogical expertise, engaging with the need for change, undertaking well-thought through development and always evaluating impact in relation to improvement in the quality of children’s learning. That is the message from successful education systems across the world. (Page 84)

This complex and ambitious model was fed into most recent review of the Standards in Scotland which were republished in 2012, coming into effect from August 2013.

All of the Standards are based upon a model which has three elements:

- Professional Values and Personal Commitment;
- Professional Knowledge and Understanding;
- Professional Skills and Abilities.

It is clearly stated in all the Standards that these elements are inherently linked to each other in the development of teachers and that one aspect does not exist independently of the others. It is the inter-relationship amongst all of the categories which develops a teacher’s understanding, practice and professionalism.

However, looking specifically at Professional Knowledge and Understanding, and using the Standards for Registration as they are mandatory requirements, we find the following:

2.1 Curriculum

Have knowledge and understanding of:

- 2.1.1 the nature of the curriculum and its development;
- 2.1.2 the relevant area(s) of pre-school, primary or secondary curriculum;
- 2.1.3 planning coherent and progressive teaching programmes;
- 2.1.5 the principles of assessment, recording and reporting.

2.2 Education Systems and Professional Responsibilities

Have knowledge and understanding of:

- 2.2.1 the principal features of the education system, educational policy and practice;
2.2.2 the schools and learning communities in which they teach and their own professional responsibilities within them.

2.3 Pedagogical Theories and Practice

Have knowledge and understanding of:

2.3.1 relevant educational principles and pedagogical theories to inform professional practices;

2.3.2 the importance of research and engagement in professional enquiry.

Professional Knowledge is therefore a complex amalgam of understandings of the Curriculum, Education Systems and Professional Responsibilities, and Pedagogical Theories and Practice. Each of these areas are then broken down into subsets and then further illustrated by associated Professional Actions.

So, for example in 2.1.1 the nature of the curriculum and its development, it is stated that student teachers should:

- develop an understanding of the principles of curriculum design and the contexts for learning;
- know about and understand the processes of change and development in the curriculum;
- develop an awareness of connections with other curricular areas, stages and sectors.

While fully registered teachers should:

- have secure and detailed understanding of the principles of curriculum design and can apply them in any setting where learning takes place;
- have secure working knowledge and detailed understanding of the processes of change and development in the curriculum;
- know how to identify and highlight connections with other curricular areas, stages or sectors, promoting learning beyond subject boundaries.

The danger in presenting this material in this way is that it may seem atomistic - and GTC Scotland is of course aware of various criticisms of Standards in the academic literature.

Standards are portrayed by some as control mechanisms, all about quality assurance and accountability. Some argue that Standards are simply for certification, a mechanistic and technicist approach which restricts reflective practice and encourages conformity. They encourage ‘competence’ but stifle ‘excellence’.

While aware of these potential concerns, GTC Scotland would reject them and point to how the Standards are approached in Scotland where they are central to teacher education but not to be used in a tick-box fashion. Indeed on the website cited above will be found a section which identifies the possible uses of the Standards by different groups within Scottish education. For example, it is suggested that classroom teachers looking at the Standard for Career-Long Professional Learning might do so in order to:

- inform themselves about career-long professional learning for all teachers, including Masters level study;
- help themselves to self evaluate in order to identify strengths and areas for development in critical thinking as part of the Professional Update process;
- inform their contribution to educational debate and discussion.

And, unlike Standards in some other countries, those in Scotland (all of them) have at their heart Professional Values and Personal Commitment which contain expectations that teachers will:

- critically examine personal and professional attitudes and beliefs and challenging assumptions and professional practice;
critically examine the connections between personal and professional attitudes and beliefs, values and practices to effect improvement and, when appropriate, bring about transformative change in practice.

Conclusion

GTC Scotland is also aware of the approaches being taken to teacher education in some other countries where subject knowledge is seen to be the key feature in successful teaching; successful teaching where teachers simply follow a prescribed method.

GTC Scotland would agree that subject knowledge is a vital feature in successful teaching but argue that it is not sufficient. For truly successful teaching there also needs to be Professional Knowledge of what it is to be a teacher. There must be Pedagogic Knowledge: what from my repertoire of teaching and learning approaches is best for this topic, with this class, in this school on this particular day? There must also be, in Lee Shulman’s term, Pedagogic Content Knowledge.

To think teaching is a straightforward activity is reductive and unlikely to lead to successful, sustained, deep learning.

To think Professional Knowledge is straightforward is to fail to acknowledge its complexity and contestability.

Writing about the complexity of contemporary education Schleicher (2012) concludes that:

In short, the kind of education needed today requires teachers to be high-level knowledge workers who constantly advance their own professional knowledge as well as that of their profession. Teachers need to be agents of innovation...

GTC Scotland would agree with these statements.

References


Turning Afresh to the Practical

Padraig Hogan

Introduction
In my contribution to this symposium, I’d like to focus on two main issues. These are recurring issues in the Interim Report of the BERA-RSA inquiry on teacher education, and in the six research papers that provide the main substance for that report. Both issues are central to teacher education in Britain, but also internationally. Helpfully, the international context features prominently in these BERA-RSA publications, providing many contrasting and illuminating perspectives for policy debates in the four nations of the UK, and more widely.

The first issue I’d like to address is the unease expressed in the BERA-RSA publications about the turn to the practical in recent reforms to teacher education. I understand the reasons for this unease but I would argue that in some important respects it is misplaced.

The second issue concerns the adequacy of the conception of teacher education contained in the BERA-RSA publications. For all their incisiveness and conceptual clarity I believe they remain somewhat distant from the experience of becoming a teacher, and of being a teacher. They don’t capture that experience in all its dimensions, in its lived fullness.

In addressing these two issues I’ll undertake a short critique, but I’d like to move beyond critique to offer, however briefly, a few ideas that are constructive, and hopefully promising.

1. The(Re)turn to the practical

“The (Re)turn to the Practical and the Discourse of Relevance” is the title of a section of the second of the six BERA-RSA research papers (Beauchamp, Clarke, Hulme, Murray 2013). The authors use this phrase to describe current trends in the UK as a whole that emphasise the school-based elements of teacher education. While acknowledging some creditable features in this (re)turn in the case of Scotland and Northern Ireland, it is clear that Beauchamp et.al view it in the main as a backward step, recalling the approaches to teacher education that were common “before the mid-1960s” (p.6). The (re)turn is more pronounced in England, they point out, largely because of the recurring intervention of government. Clearly, the more recent interventions in England, like the introduction of the School Direct scheme, are scarcely hospitable to a research-informed conception of teacher education. Beauchamp et al maintain that such interventions rest on “an understanding of teaching as (a) essentially a craft rather than an intellectual activity; (b) an apprenticeship model of teacher training that can be located entirely in the workplace; and (c) the related assumption that the more time spent in schools inevitably – and unproblematically – leads to better and ‘more relevant’ learning.” (pp. 7-8)

I accept that the teacher education policies of Michael Gove’s Ministry of Education are largely a backward step. My concern is that the critique of these policies by Beauchamp et al reveals a restricted conception of the practical. That critique overlooks in particular the research value of the practical. In my view the educational research community needs a richer understanding of the practical than is evident in the BERA-RSA interim report, and in some of the contributing papers. Beauchamp et al associate the turn to the practical with “craft” and

with “apprenticeship”, these being placed in marked contrast with the intellectual. The paper by Winch, Orchard & Oancea takes a different approach, acknowledging that there are complexities in expert craft work (p.5). Yet the research potential of the practical – as distinct from both “common sense” and “practical wisdom” – is under-explored in the BERA-RSA publications.
Aristotle, in using the term praxis to describe the practical as a sphere of action, has emphasised that the practical is chiefly concerned with what ought to be done: with action in one or other domain that is carefully thought about, so as to make that action fruitful and defensible. Such action is that of a practitioner, whether as a practitioner of politics (in the polis), of home-making (in the oikonomia), or of any of modern-day practices like nursing, medicine, or teaching. This is a different and more inclusive kind of activity than in popular conceptions of the practical, where it is taken to mean “getting things done”. It also differs from professional conceptions of practice, viz. the application of theory/technique. Clearly, insights from warranted theories can inform the actions of practitioners, but such informing is properly mediated by an ethical and deliberative reasoning that Aristotle called phronesis. That is to say, a form of phronesis properly belongs to every practice, even to ones like engineering. And if the appropriate deliberative reasoning is bypassed in favour of a more technical application of theory, then the practice in question suffers distortion or diminution; as it does with a “practical wisdom” that is unheedful of appropriate research insights.

If practice and the practical are understood in the more inclusive way I’ve just sketched, then craft, and indeed apprenticeship, far from marking the absence of the intellectual, can disclose promising variants of intellectual activity. Crafting is often described as the making of artefacts through skilful co-ordination of hand and eye. But it is not just a matter of skill in making. Careful crafting calls for the most astute discernment – whether it be the crafting of a vase, or of a poem, or of a research paper, or of a science lesson. Against all reductive conceptions of craft, Richard Sennett has perceptively shown how thinking and feeling, reflection and imagination, memory and ingenuity, are contained within the process of crafting (pp.7, 211-12, 295).

As for apprenticeship, daily habituation in unquestioning routines, in hierarchies based on ingrained distinctions, can domesticate or even imprison the creativity and energies of newcomers to a practice. But apprenticeship can mean something quite different if it is served within communities of practitioners where creativity and innovation have themselves become something of a habit.

From a critical research perspective, there are good reasons then why a turn to the practical may be a productive one; why explorations of concepts like practice and practitioner may even be more fruitful for our understanding of teacher education than the often-invoked concept of profession might be.

2. A more practical conception of teacher education

What is distinctive to teaching as a practice becomes clearer when we ask a question like the following: “What kind of learning do I have to engage in to become capable as a teacher that is different from the kind I have to engage in if I want to become capable as an engineer, or a nurse? The kind of learning in question arises from the inherent necessities of the practice of teaching itself, so we need to unfold the experience from within. Doing so calls attention to capabilities as distinct from competences and identifies, at a minimum, five intermingling domains of relationship in which I need to become capable as a teacher:

1. my relationship to the subject(s) I teach;
2. my relationship to the students / pupils to whom I teach these subjects;
3. my relationship to teaching colleagues and school management;
4. my relationship to parents / guardians and the wider society.
5. my relationship to myself (i.e. my self-understanding, where all the other relationships come together – well, poorly, or maybe not at all).

Each of these domains can of course be subdivided. Each moreover contains a plurality of relationships, in number and in character. But shortcomings in any one domain will bring trouble on my work as a teacher. So fluency in all five needs continuing cultivation in the
learning experiences of teachers. In its exercise moreover such fluency needs to embody
care and justice in discerning measure. Not surprisingly then, all five domains are in need of,
and are enhanced through, research-informed insights.

Viewed from the outside, each of these five domains might be viewed as a possession; the
possession of knowledge in some cases, the possession of skills in others. For instance, the
first domain might be regarded as the possession of appropriate “subject matter knowledge”;
the second as the possession of appropriate “pedagogical content knowledge.” In taking a
different perspective I don’t wish to discredit the researches of Shulman, whose work on
concepts like “pedagogical content knowledge” has been largely helpful to developments in
teacher education. I want to stress however that teaching well is not primarily about
possessing knowledge and skills. It is more a way of being and relating than a matter of
having and performing. Teaching as a practice involves a certain ontological shift on the part
of the practitioner and the would-be practitioner. It’s not the kind of shift that is accomplished
once and for all; rather the kind which one hopefully makes in some meaningful degree in
one’s experiences of becoming a teacher, and which one struggles to preserve, to regain,
to enrich in one’s more mature experiences as a practitioner.

For reasons like these, a turn to the practical by teacher educators is a fertile prospect. The
five-fold learning experience I’ve sketched means developing capability in pedagogical
variants of Aristotelian phronesis; but also something more. As suggested by the reference
to an ontological shift, teacher education also involves something that is properly Socratic:
the insight that the unexamined practice is not worth engaging in. This is especially so where
the practice in question is easily distorted, and can do immense harm if it becomes seriously
so. Being capable as our most constructive critics is crucial where our practice centrally
involves encouraging learners toward unforced disclosures of their ever-emergent
potentialities and limitations; toward their ownmost sense of personal and cultural identity.
To conclude, and to begin: A shift to the Socratic as a research tradition betokens the most
promising of landscapes for teacher education.
Educating Capitalists: Constructive Practice in the Face of Liquid Fear

Barbara Stengel

Nearly 40 years ago, my father, a confirmed capitalist, and I sat, over our third glass of wine, talking about the state of our world(s). In a conversational pattern that was predictable and regularly repeated, topics transitioned from the people we knew and loved to our work and eventually to the intersection of politics and economics. Here the conversation became “energized,” both of us excited by the chance to say what we thought without any need to pull punches. We agreed, we disagreed and we communicated both agreement and disagreement vigorously – and late into the night.

As this particular round came to a close, my father offered a curious observation. He noted that he and I appeared much alike to outside observers – both knowledgeable, articulate and not hesitant to speak directly, both apparently accomplished -- but that he realized that he often acted out of fear and I typically acted out of confidence. The latter seemed true. I knew only security as a youngster, reinforced by success at the things that seemed to count – school, sports and speaking in public – though I would later have that confidence shaken by personal and professional missteps and multiple moments of failure. But that my highly accomplished, well-rewarded and apparently confident father was moved by fear was a revelation.

Today, I would argue not that he was moved by fear, but that he moved courageously and constructively despite the affective impact of uncertainty, an insidious uncertainty that has become the defining marker of our age for both winners and losers. The challenge today is to educate beyond fear, while tempering misplaced or naïve confidence. This talk has its roots in those late night conversations about capitalism, in my father’s revelation, and in my more recently developed understanding of fear and courage in an age framed by political and economic terrorism.

I begin with the assumption that we are all capitalists now whatever socialist mantras we mouth, in the same way that we are all Kantians and perhaps all, at some level, Platonists. Those living (and visiting) in Oxford in 2014 are touched and shaped by capitalist practice, capitalist products, and capitalist norms in ways that we cannot escape. The insecurities global capitalism inscribes are the source as well as the outcome of the pattern of political terrorism that came into focus on 9/11. We are held fast by what Zygmunt Bauman (2006) calls “liquid fear” We live “in a state of constant anxiety about the dangers that could strike unannounced and at any moment.” This is, after all, the point of terrorism, political or economic: to disrupt effective action by disabling the confidence needed to proceed or resist. We are discomfited. We spend our time and energy trying to figure out what the threat is, let alone how we can respond to it. We are rendered impotent.

The question arises, Is education even possible under conditions of late (corporate/consumer) capitalism? If the consumer and the corporation play the reciprocal roles the economic system assigns to them, is there any room for growth? For legitimate qualification (not mere credentializing) and generative socialization (issuing in right relation rather than simply discipline), let alone authentic subjectification (for empowered agency) (Biesta, 20XX)? It is tempting to answer “no” and go home in light of the analyses of Bauman and others, but that is not an acceptable answer to educators or to parents, indeed to anyone who aspires or intends to live well beyond the constraints of the “The Matrix.” As I have argued before, the call to educate is the call to be “so open it hurts” (Stengel, 2013) to pursue what can be done in the face of what feels impossible. This is not an existentialist fiat but a communal commitment.

This essay represents my effort to accept the fact of capitalism as a (the dominating?) social practice of the 21st century while tilting against the fearful powerlessness it seems to imply, to ask what it might mean to educate capitalists toward potent(ial) action. Along the way, I raise three more questions: 1) What is the quality of capitalism’s current enactment?
2) What would it mean to enact capitalism courageously and constructively? 3) How can we educate for courageous, constructive capitalism? This essay focuses on the middle task.

As we shall see further on, I maintain that capitalists can be educated both by teaching them the tasks, talk, tools and norms of capitalism and teaching them when what appear to be the tasks, talk, tools and norms of capitalism are counter-productive to the point of capitalism itself, as well as to human flourishing. This approach serves capitalism itself in the sense that it keeps capitalism viable and saves it from the internal contradictions that will lead to revolution or devolution. Ironically, it is only by educating for practices and norms other than (financial) profit seeking and freedom, that profit seeking and free markets can continue to drive growth and well-being.

While “worldly philosophers” might describe capitalism as a model for economic organization and relation, and modern day Ayn Rand adherents might describe it as a “social system based on individual rights,” (see, e.g., www.capitalism.org), I want to suggest that educators would do well to understand capitalism as the constitutive social practice of the 21st century developed and developing world imaginary. That is, capitalism is the way we in the developed/ing world enact ourselves and our possibilities, even when, maybe especially when, we claim the value of alternative arrangements like socialism.

In line with this framing of capitalism, I will use the term “capitalist” to refer not just to those who control the means of production, or to those whose freedom is the fuel for economic enterprise, but to any person whose life practices tend to keep the capitalist world/view in place. This includes workers and consumers as well as those who own and operate the means of production. It includes the very wealthy and the very poor to the extent that either accepts the logic of the free market. It includes all those who speculate and/or consume at the expense of investment and invention. In truth, it includes all of us who share in the benefits of the corporate West whatever our rhetoric.

**Capitalism’s Current Troubles**

If capitalism is the social practice shaping life possibilities in the 21st century, what are the discourses and norms that shape the practice? What are the affordances and constraints, the benefits and deficits, of the practice as currently constituted? Are capitalism’s inherent contradictions playing out toward some end game? Is the inconsistent enactment of capitalism by its most devoted adherents self-defeating? Others have taken on these questions in depth. For my purposes, we need only acknowledge that there is deep discontent with the way capitalism is enacted today in both materialist and cultural terms.

The discontent is understandable in light of telling indicators:

1) GINI coefficients are rising world wide (Pasquali, 2013).
2) Global estimates of forced labor are up, including sex trafficking (International Labor Organization, 2012).
3) Banks are "too big to fail" and auto manufacturers are bailed out when they face bankruptcy, but individual homeowners under water on their mortgages are left unaided and those unemployed in the US have recently had their benefits cut.

The Roman Catholic Pope and the American President are not at all happy about the problematic impact of global capitalism. Francis I had this to say in response to British Prime Minister David Cameron when Cameron opposed the United Nations effort to reduce income inequality:

Every economic and political theory or action must set about providing each inhabitant of the planet with the minimum wherewithal to live in dignity and freedom, with the possibility of supporting a family, educating children, praising God and developing one’s own human potential. This is the main thing; in the absence of such a vision, all economic activity is meaningless (2013a).

While the Roman Catholic Pope is denouncing a “dictatorship’ of a global economic system and a free market that perpetuates inequality and ‘devours’ what is fragile, including
human beings and the environment.” (Francis I, 2013a), the American president is both expending and attempting to build political capital by pegging basic levels of opportunity to the very possibility of citizenship. Obama’s December, 2013 speech on income inequality and declining mobility address dissatisfaction with key elements of the present practice of capitalism, for example, the need to strengthen unions and reduce the pay gap between men and women.

Economists on both sides of the political spectrum agree that things are not going well. Left-leaning Joseph Stiglitz (2013) describes the city of Detroit’s bankruptcy as an inevitable, an inevitable outcome of the market, resulting in more economically segregated, self-reinforcing inequality. Arthur Brooks, the president of the right-leaning American Enterprise Institute, defends “free enterprise” -- the preferred term for those who wish to avoid the negative temper of a Marxist critique and tap the American ethos of freedom – but argues that it

... does not mean shredding the social safety net, but championing policies that truly help vulnerable people and build an economy that can sustain these commitments. It doesn’t mean reflexively cheering big business, but leveling the playing field so competition trumps cronyism. It doesn’t entail “anything goes” libertinism, but self-government and self-control. And it certainly doesn’t imply that unfettered greed is laudable or even acceptable (Brooks, 2013).

Some of the super-rich agree. Billionaire Warren Buffett’s son, Peter, criticizes “the charitable-industrial complex,” practicing “philanthropic colonialism.” Says Buffett, “As more lives and communities are destroyed by the system that creates vast amounts of wealth for the few, the more heroic it sounds to “give back.” However, this just keeps the existing structure of inequality, what Buffett calls a “perpetual poverty machine,” in place.

The American film industry continues to explore the material, cultural and psychic impact of global capitalism. J.C. Chandor’s “All is Lost” is “a fable about the soul of man under global capitalism. Our Man is a privileged consumer (just look at all the stuff he has on his boat) whose fate is set in motion by a box full of goods (children’s sneakers, as it happens) accidentally knocked out of circulation” (Scott, 2013). Terrified but poised, Robert Redford’s Our Man is a companion image to the panicked investment bankers in Chandor’s earlier “Margin Call” whose financial house of cards is crumbling. Both films explore “how powerful men react when their sense of control is challenged,” as well as “the vast, invisible system that sustains their illusions” (Scott, 2013). Even capitalism’s winners, it seems, cannot escape the insecurity woven into the present practice of capitalism.

This brief survey is offered as a prima facie case that capitalism as we are currently practicing it is not constructive, either for the maintenance of capitalism or for purposes of human flourishing. If our present practice of capitalism isn’t satisfying, i.e. if it doesn’t create and sustain its own constituency, then what would it look like to enact it constructively?

**Constructive Capitalism**

Economics as a disciplined study is fundamentally focused on scarcity. There would be no economics were it not for the (apparently “natural”) human condition of having unlimited wants and needs in the face of limited resources. Those needs and wants and resources are never only monetary. Economics is about the desire for and lack of time, affection, freedom and meaningful work as well as food, shelter, gadgets and the money to obtain them. It is about the desire for a full belly as well as a desire, as poet Marge Piercy (1982) puts it, “to be of use.”

Capitalism -- as a set of varied models, as a political stance, and as a socio-economic practice -- constitutes a response to this state of affairs. Each version of capitalism, lived or theoretical, itself arises from a desire (a want and need) to live well in the face of limited possibilities, and each version claims, explicitly or implicitly, that this is the way (for most) to live well. Given that capitalism carries within itself seeds of its own destruction (and I do take that as a given), then what is the practice of capitalism that staves off that destruction? It is
here, of course, that fear (potentially, though not inevitably) enters this always precariously balanced equation. What if I cannot get enough [money, love, food, freedom, safety]? What if my [money, love, food, freedom, safety] runs out? And what constitutes enough? As my mother used to tell me, “Money doesn’t grow on trees.” But even oranges, which do grow on trees, can be scarce (or extremely expensive) commodities when environmental conditions or transportation costs or corporate greed intervene. We want oranges for our children, they need them for Vitamin C and good health, and too many of us do not have enough money to afford them.

Enacting capitalism constructively and educating capitalists to do so implicates cognition, affection and act intertwined in disposition. If we are to step over the bane of our age, liquid fear toward constructive action, we need not the disciplining of emotions but the recognition that feelings draw attention to critical hypotheses for action. We are open to emotion and called to action when our attention “is strongly drawn to complex and inconceivable circumstances” (Peirce, 1868). Modern media (as a tool for news, cultural narrative and targeted marketing) have the capacity to tap affect and draw our attention to focus on (perhaps artificial) scarcity.

A perception of scarcity is real in experience whether or not it exists in concrete circumstance. That perception of scarcity of any valued object – especially an object perceived as needed for physical and psychic survival -- has an affective valence that can easily transition from bodily excitation to fearful feeling to the behaviors of avoidance that mark the experience of fear (Stengel, 2013). Enacting capitalism constructively requires preventing the perception of scarcity – real or imagined, grounded or constructed – from becoming the avoidant behavior that cripples constructive action. Our task is not to avoid the affects prompted by uncertainty (impossible in any case), but to short-circuit the apparent inevitability of uncomfortable affects becoming fearful action. Before unpacking proposed criteria for enacting capitalism constructively, I describe some exemplars of practicing capitalism to instantiate the points I will make below.

**Practicing Capitalism**

My father, Walter T. Senkowski used the GI Bill to get an engineering degree, forged a career in sales management in the heavy construction equipment and then parlayed that into a position as the CEO of a medium-sized American corporation. When he took that position, he negotiated a contract that linked his compensation largely to the company’s performance. Then he produced substantial profits – except when he didn’t, when an economic downturn buffeted the business so dependent on building. Because he was a savvy enough capitalist to know that downturns were inevitable, he always distributed and invested profits in the good years and he invested as well in relationships of trust with bankers and union leaders. Downturns were absorbed by the company fairly easily and absorbed by my family because we lived modestly in comparison to the size of his “good years” income.

My father was never the owner of that particular means of production, but the contract he negotiated brought him enough capital both to live well and to invest in the elite education of six children and enough to invest in the stock market to provide for later years neither he nor my mother lived to enjoy. He was an enthusiastic advocate of capitalism as he practiced it, but realistic about its contradictions and critical of those who represented capitalism’s excesses.

In one of our earliest talks, one that took place when I was an undergraduate, my dad was talking about paying 77% marginal tax rate on income over $200,000. I remember asking him whether it was fair that the government took “his” money. He just laughed and said, “I’m just glad that I make enough money that they can take it. It’s a great problem to have.” This led us to a philosophical conversation about whose money the earnings were and how one could tell. In 1971, earning that much money enabled a comfortable standard of living that left me and my siblings with a solid, if naïve, sense of security. If he could provide for his family, he was satisfied, because that was his primary responsibility.
But he would not fulfill his responsibility to his family at the expense of those he employed. He made sure that all employees, both salaried and hourly, both contract and unionized, shared in the good years and were respected in the lean years. In one of our conversations, he described in “salty” language, how he had to pull a union negotiator aside to tell him that he had to ask for more money because now was the time the company had it to give. He couldn’t guarantee that the dollars would be there next time. Profitability was always a goal, but maximizing immediate profit, was not always the best way to get there.

Magdalen House in Nashville, TN is something like a shelter for women who were already leveraging their own human capital as prostitutes. Prostitution is itself a capitalist enterprise that warrants careful analysis though not our task here. It is enough to recall that the rise of capitalism as a socioeconomic arrangement brought with it a new ideology of gender oppression.

As urban commodity manufacture for exchange replaced rural production for use, men were converted into propertyless workers; the Earth was reimagined as a lifeless machine, ripe for exploitation, and women were driven systematically and forcibly from production into unremunerated – and therefore valueless – reproductive activities in the home (Williams, 2014).

Women in the developed/ing world whose home-making activities don’t pay (or don’t pay enough if done for others) turn to whatever means they might have at their disposal to make a living. Walking the streets is a time-honored response. But it is also a soul-sacrificing one. Magdalen House is the brainchild of Episcopal minister Becca Stevens whose philanthropic impulse and Christian charity attracted the venture capital to start this enterprise. Taking a page from Jane Addams’ (1892) theory of philanthropy (different from the corporate philanthropy Peter Buffett decries), Becca and her congregation have not simply offered shelter for drug-abusing prostitutes but have transformed entrepreneurial and capitalist talents into nearly self-supporting enterprises known as Thistle Farms and the Thistle Stop Café. Women who live at Magdalen (for up to two years) work producing and distributing body care and stationery products or serving and managing in the café. Working and earning one’s own living restores the body and soul connection even as it knits back together the women’s self-respect. “Love heals,” the Thistle Farms motto, suggests both the Christian commitment captured in Martin Luther King, Jr.’s (1963) sermon “Antidotes to Fear,” but also a form of capitalism powered not only by profit but also by other-directedness and satisfying labor that represents respectable “usefulness.”

There is a similar challenge facing students and teachers at Shelby Middle School (a pseudonym) where my students, my colleagues and I are spending a significant amount of time trying to figure out how to educate kids, teachers leaders and families in one coordinated effort. The common interpretation of the “problem” this school presents is “low achievement.” The fix for this low achievement is to raise test scores. The “thinness” of both problem-posing and solution-setting by policy makers is noteworthy: higher test scores will enable (a few of) these poorest of the poor kids to attend college (in the absence of significant financial aid and social support) and attending college will enable them to get ahead (despite the reality that the American economy does not have jobs for its most recent college graduates).

The majority of Shelby scholars live lives that define insecurity and they do so without any illusion. Nothing – not physical security, nor enough healthy food, nor warm clothing, nor emotional stability, nor even home – can be taken for granted. Nonetheless these kids are grounding me as my own children did until their passage into responsible adulthood, calling me weekly to think beyond extant public policy toward outcomes that might help them to enact capitalism in ways that benefit them and the social world we inhabit in common. We will educate each scholar (as the school personnel refer to them) so that s/he can go to college when and if that possibility seems useful, but it makes no sense to educate only for college in a world where college functions as a machine sorting kids like them out. Whether or not the Shelby scholars pursue higher education, they will
practice capitalism. If these scholars are to enact capitalism in ways that support them physically, psychically and socially, what do they have to learn?

Proposed Criteria for the Enactment of Constructive Capitalism

Enacting capitalism constructively means inhabiting and reinforcing a social practice that supports persons-in-relation physically, psychically and socially, enabling individual agents and communities to sidestep or overstep the experience of insecurity and uncertainty that gives way to fear in order to act for themselves and others. A constructive enactment of capitalism restores reliability to market relations. Constructive capitalists experience no less material uncertainty but greater predictability rooted in social expectations that are themselves part of the practice.

That this constructive capitalism remains courageous capitalism suggests an admittedly paradoxical quality to what I am proposing. If capitalism as currently enacted is the frame for the “liquid fear” that acts back on us, can it be enacted differently? I assert that the answer is a qualified “yes,” as long as we keep capitalism’s status as a social practice firmly in view.

I suggest the following as candidate criteria for renewing the practice of capitalism. The person-in-relation who enacts capitalism constructively:

1) seeks out what is self-sustaining and invests in it,
2) cultivates other-awareness and responds to it,
3) regards (and if necessary, renders) diversity as a resource,
4) recognizes healthy limits to and discounts the deservedness of excess compensation,
5) avoids commodification,
6) takes responsibility for 1-5.

These are self-adjusting meso-level social practices that can make capitalism satisfying and sustainable in the moment, in the short run and in the long run.

Seeks out what is self-sustaining and invests in it

The constructive capitalist has his or her eye not on profit per se but on what profit serves: the sustenance of persons, individually and collectively. It is easy to understand, however, why profit grabs the attention of the emerging capitalist. Profit is bewitching because it is so easily measured! Profit provides a number, facilitating comparison-making and rendering judgment unnecessary. Because “numbers don’t lie,” boards and bosses are relieved of decision-making about the state of affairs.

This is, of course, an illusion. Numbers that represent measurable realities are proxys for something we really want. In the case of student test scores, that something is responsible adults who are good parents, good neighbors, good workers, good friends, etc. The test scores, even the prospective college degrees, are simply indicators that the students might be on the right track.

Profits, similarly, indicate that some economic entity might be on the right track. But that claim is a judgment that must be based on a justification of why and how that number represents what we really want: to make the best computer and have large numbers of persons recognize that (and to make me rich); to sell the most (useful and useless) hardware and home goods to the most people (and to make me rich); to support my family; to be of use; to find my way in the world.

Profit is bewitching; but it is also illusory. How does the capitalist avoid bewitchment and illusion? By anchoring him- or herself in purpose that is self-sustaining, psychologically, emotionally, and intellectually as well as financially. This requires identification of larger purposes and investing in the pursuit of those purposes.

For my father, the larger purpose was singular: to support his family. So he took the risk of a bonus compensation plan to be able to support us better, but not until he had invested in himself, in his education and his early experience. He had a self-proclaimed
“compelling curiosity” about anything that might in any way inform his work, reading voraciously and well into the night. But he never, ever forgot why he pursued the profit. Those profits were the means to what was for him a self-sustaining end: the security of me and my siblings.

The women of Magdalen all responded to an invitation to come off the streets precisely because the profitable endeavor that was prostitution was not self-sustaining. It was, at least for these women, self-demeaning and self-defeating – and usually prompted or accompanied by addiction. Whether they acted entrepreneurially, as the owners of the capital constituted by their own body, or as a worker offering up surplus labor for the benefit of a pimp who "owned" them, they were able – when an alternative was offered – to recognize that the path they pursued in the practice of capitalism did not point toward "bliss" for them or others. The alternative – life at Magdalen and work at Thistle Farms – provides a supportive and self-supporting time-out so that each woman can recognize and pursue her bliss: perhaps further education or regaining custody of her children.

Marx’ 1844 essay, “Estranged Labor” offers the observation that labor and profit (and prices and jobs and even markets) do not exist independent of historical circumstances like the GI Bill that made my father’s education possible or the existence of Magdalen House with alternative work opportunities (Lave and McDermott, 2013). Moreover, these material circumstances form and are formed by the relation between a person and his or her work. Put simply, labor and profit are relational concepts and their meaning is constructed in context. It is easier for some to seek and find meaningful work and support than it is for others. I am acutely aware that it was easier for my children than it will be for the children of Shelby Middle School. The material conditions of their lives and their schooling delimit both the identification and pursuit of that which is self-sustaining.

Cultivates other-awareness and responds to it

The capitalism of this age is often characterized as either corporate or consumer or both intertwined. One implication of this characterization is that the consumer attends to the corporation as the purveyor of what the consumer desires and the corporation attends to the consumer only as a consumer, that is, as the source of income that keeps the profit machine running. This tightly knit, utterly utilitarian and “consuming” relation leaves little room for awareness of the other whose very presence may redirect resources and/or reconceive desire. And this lack of awareness is, ironically and paradoxically, a problem for capitalism as Marx and others have pointed out. Maximizing profit in one set of circumstances may lead to conditions that render maximizing profit difficult in another set of circumstances. This is the object lesson in a whole line of “greed is good” novels and films. The single-minded pursuit of profit not only gets in the way of the good life construed as a life of integrity and loving relation, but it can get in the way of getting rich! And a lack of integrity renders the free markets capitalists rely on as unreliable.

The danger is that we stake out a place for ourselves at the center – socially, academically, economically – and end “by being caught up in a web of obsessions and procedures” (Francis I, 2013b, p. 42). Those obsessions and procedures orient us away from investment toward speculation, away from the long-term and toward the short-term, away from the other toward a self-defeating narcissism. Constructive capitalism requires judgment about whether, when and how to press one’s economic advantage.

Recall my father’s encouraging union leaders to ask for more in contract negotiations in good times. Surely this brought him some sense of satisfaction, confirming his “goodness.” But it brought him something else that paid off at a later date: the relative financial security of the workers whose contract did not leave them in dire straits during an economic trough and the trust of the union leaders later when conditions made it difficult to offer generous terms.

Magdalen House and Thistle Farms were founded and grown by an other-aware capitalist community that recognizes that its own economic security is contingent. Most members of the community that supports Magdalen are relatively well off. Their response is
admittedly philanthropic, but not purely philanthropic because it instantiates constructive
capitalism.

The women of Magdalen are learning the responsiveness of other-aware capitalism
through their work at Thistle Farms and the Thistle Stop Café. ‘Profits’ not only support them
but are plowed back in to the enterprise to support the next generation of residents. Each
one of the women comes to view herself as a model for the next woman coming along.

The adolescents at Shelby Middle School are very far from thinking of themselves as
role models for any one else. As they seek out their own roles in the world, who are the
models they gravitate toward? Not surprisingly, these are family members who by and large
are not practicing capitalism with financial success and sports and entertainment stars who
are not obviously other-aware. In a time of life when they are both tuned in to others and
focused on the formation of their own identities, these young men and women encounter few
exemplars of constructive capitalism.

Regards (and if necessary, renders) diversity as a resource

Diversity is not only or always a problem; it is always also a resource. Diversity – the
generative juxtaposition of persons, objects and ideas – brings newness. It has a “revivifying
effect” as Jane Addams (1930) noted. A diversity of ideas expands thinking. A diversity of
designs prompts innovation. A diversity of persons expands understanding in community. A
diversity of markets expands profits.

But diversity often prompts fearful withdrawal as well, perhaps because it constitutes
a challenge to the status quo, and whether the status quo is positive or painful, its status as
quod is habituated and not easily surrendered. Such is the state in the present Catholic
Church and Francis I recognizes what the fear is and might be: “More than by fear of going
astray, my hope is that we will be moved by the fear of remaining shut up within structures
which give us a false sense of security, within rules which make us harsh judges, within
habits which make us feel safe” (2013b), when, in fact, the status quo is preserving what we
don’t want and preventing what we do want.

Consider the failure to bring women and men of color to corporate boards, a failure
documented not long ago in a study by McKinsey and Company and cited in the New York
Times by Nicholas Kristof (2013). Companies with a critical mass of women on their
corporate boards far outperformed the average company in return on equity and other
measures. Their presence results in more than “social justice.” Rather, appointing women
actually serves the stated goal of capitalist enterprise: to maximize profit.

Testosterone-light females bring greater openness to new directions, less risk
tolerance, and thinking that is both more long-term and more forward-looking – and these
dispositions (leavening the inclinations of their male counterparts) increase profits. The
point is not that women are better business decision-makers. It is that women and men
working together make better decisions, because the diversity they represent is a resource
rather than a problem. “The best problem solving doesn’t come from a group of the best
individual problem-solvers, but from a diverse team whose members complement one
another,” offering varied participation/leadership by gender, race, economic background, and
ideology (Kristof, 2013.)

Sometimes the diversity represented is a function of people, whether of gender in the
corporate board room or ambition and position represented in the Lincoln/Obama “Team of
Rivals” model of political cabinets. Sometimes the diversity lay in the multiple business
directions exemplified by Thistle Farms and the Thistle Stop Café. Sometimes the diversity
can be found in cross-generational interaction or in individual student thinking found in the
typical school. Sometimes the diversity emerges from one’s own “compelling curiosity” to
understand what is not yet known. Diversity is always a resource even when it appears to be
a problem.

Recognizes healthy limits to and discounts the deservedness of excess compensation
Many years ago (1935), Parker Brothers recognized that capitalism might be the basis of the compelling board game that became Monopoly. More recently, researchers have used Monopoly as the basis for revealing studies about the psychology of capitalism, demonstrating that “Higher Social Class Predicts Increased Unethical Behavior” (Piff, 2014).

Paul Piff set up and observed two-player Monopoly games in which the players start with unequal capital ($2,000 vs. $1,000), experience unequal opportunity (rolling two dice vs. one die each turn), and receive unequal compensation ($200 vs. $100 for passing “Go”). Journalist Lisa Miller describes an observation of “T-Shirt” and “Glasses” playing Monopoly:

T-Shirt isn’t just winning; he’s crushing Glasses. Initially, he reacted to the inequality between him and his opponent with a series of smirks, an acknowledgement, perhaps, of the inherent awkwardness of the situation. ... Soon, though, as he whizzes around the board, purchasing properties and collecting rent, whatever discomfort he feels seems to dissipate. He’s a skinny kid, but he balloons in size, spreading his limbs toward the far ends of the table. He smacks his playing piece (in the experiment, the wealthy player gets the Rolls Royce) as he makes the circuit – *smack, smack, smack* – ending his turns with board-shuddering *bang!* Four minutes in, he picks up Glasses’s piece, the little elf shoe, and moves it for him. As the game nears its finish, T-Shirt moves his Rolls faster. The taunting is over now: He’s all efficiency. He refuses to meet Glasses’s gaze. His expression is stone cold as he takes the loser’s cash (Miller, 2012).

Not only is the poorer player bound to lose, but he is bound to endure the constant reinforcement to the richer player’s sense of deservedness and entitlement – and the taunting that seems to be built in. It is only too easy to forget that the game is rigged. The winners in capitalism are encouraged to believe that they deserve their gains, and the public policy the winners are in a position to control reflects that.

Would you play? Or would you disrupt the game in any way you could? What is astounding is how many of us do play a game we have no chance of winning. Is this a function of America’s version of Plato’s Noble Lie? Is this why the American public accepts willingly a state of affairs in which the typical CEO earns 231 times what the average worker earns in a year (Mishel, 2012)? Remember that economics arises from and in conditions of scarcity. Were all workers to have all that they need, CEOs could earn a million times their salary and it would be far less problematic -- *as long as we don’t take the capitalist game seriously as a indicator of merit.* As Daniel Kahneman and Angus Deaton (2010) report, money doesn’t buy happiness for most Americans – once they reach a solid middle class income of $70,000. Given this finding that money doesn’t buy happiness after a certain level and the modeling of billionaires like Warren Buffett, Bill Gates and Mark Zuckerberg who are actively giving away their money and encouraging others to do the same, it appears that it *is* possible to cultivate a capitalist ethos that discounts the deservedness of the winners, even for the winners.

My father’s wry remark that he was just happy to be in the 70% marginal tax bracket is an example of that. What educated him to reject his own deservedness? Was he simply smart enough to recognize how the game was played and unwilling to claim an advantage that was unconnected to his own actions?

What business executives like my father have in common is that they are employees but not workers in Marx’s sense. That is, they do not have controlling ownership of the means of production (though often, they have a stake in it through stock options) but they do get richer as they produce wealth for others. Their compensation based on performance both increases their own wealth as the company profits and often moves them into ownership by earning stock options. Marx’s worker becomes poorer the more wealth s/he produces, a development that has increased exponentially over the past 40 years in the US as workers have become more and more productive but are paid less and less in relative dollars. That worker *is produced as a commodity* and in times of high unemployment, the price it costs to hire/acquire that commodity goes down. The CEO *qua* capitalist is wildly
successful precisely because he is squeezing the life out of workers, and what's worse, he believes his success is a function of his talent and hard work even as he is demonstrating that hard work and talent to not pay off for workers. This inequity is both immoral and counterproductive to capitalism in the long run, undercutting Adam Smith’s (1776) premise of the “invisible hand.”

The young men and women of Shelby Middle School do not for the most part imagine themselves as workers in poorly or even well-paying jobs. They will not, by their own estimation, follow in their parents’ footsteps, but will be professional athletes or entertainers or, more likely, just famous people with lots of money. They don’t have any sense of what is deserved, only a Stage 2 Kohlberg sense of justice and a tendency to equate desire with deservedness. “I deserve it because I want it” is the operant logic.

The women of Magdalen are not winners and they are expressively grateful to be in a place where modest financial security is paired with physical safety and a sense of emotional integrity. But they remain perhaps too grateful for the largesse of others, believing that those who contribute deserve what they have and harboring a hope that they too might come to that place of comfort. Enabling these women to recognize the contingency of deservedness is as important as educating the Shelby kids to connect effort with outcome.

**Avoids commodification**

If Marx taught us nothing else, it is that commodification is the danger in capitalism. The Monopoly player knows that properties are commodities to be traded and that the houses and hotels that one builds on those properties are also commodities to be traded. But he may not realize that by putting a pricetag on his own success, he has made a commodity of himself. CEOs are commodities to be traded – and the “most successful” company is, ironically enough, the one with the highest paid CEO.

Commodification is the capitalist infection parasitic on our conceptual apparatus. Goods, services, ideas, persons, relationships, life events, even epiphanies and insights are reified into tradeable entities. Markets are created for their trade, the invisible hand of supply and demand sets price, and the unwary trader is caught in the game, shaped by the game, seduced by the game, his or her very desires eventually unrecognizable.

Is commodification avoidable? In some sense, no. However, that does not mean that one cannot develop and maintain a robust double consciousness that acknowledges the play of commodification even as it resists it. Thistle Farms is a non-profit corporation but it needs a healthy income as vigorously as any CEO and corporate board need profitability. There are human lives at stake at Thistle Farms, not account statements. There is pressure to make more money, but making more exists as a goal in the context of one rallying cry, “Love heals.” And there is faith that that rallying cry has efficacy.

One might object that religious faith has no place in this particular argument, but it is hard to deny that capitalism is itself a faith stance with articles of faith no less compelling and no less chimerical than “Love heals.” At Thistle Farms, people are not commodities – even when the practices of the enterprise push in that direction.

My father was quite cognizant that he had made of himself a commodity, trading his considerable talents to a group of less knowledgeable but well-off investors who did not understand that the deal he cut with them would benefit him at least as much as it benefitted them. But he rendered himself a commodity tentatively and temporarily as a means to his primary end, supporting his family, and he did it knowing that it was not personally sustainable for him to treat others – people and even objects – as mere commodities to be traded when those people held those objects in meaningful relation.

**Takes responsibility for 1-5**

So we have come full circle. Avoiding commodification is intertwined with investing in what is personally sustainable. Taking responsibility around the circle is the challenge. This is not the kind of “personal responsibility” that those espousing free enterprise seem to have
in mind. Rather, I ask, How can any person acting in a capitalist (free market, profit motivated) environment

1) recognize that s/he is always acting in response to persons and circumstances s/he does not control,

2) act responsively with respect to the material and spiritual conditions in play in the lives of the persons to whom s/he responds, and

3) accept responsibility for action in that that action represents who s/he is in the world?

Capitalism is a relational practice. It is constituted by and recognized through the way it is enacted in the world, that is, by the tasks, tools, and talk that mark it and by the norms that issue from its enactment. It unquestionably functions as a system that disciplines us in a Foucauldian sense, but it need not be determinative. Capitalism can be enacted more or less constructively or destructively, evaluated against criteria that coalesce remarkably whether considered as moral or as economic. The challenge is to educate capitalists, both to enact capitalism (by participating in markets as producers as well as consumers) and to enact it constructively (by refocusing that participation using the criteria articulated above).

Educating Capitalists

My purpose in this essay has been substantial but quite modest: to acknowledge the destructive impact of capitalism as currently enacted and to suggest that an alternative enactment is imaginable and possible. This means accepting the contradictions inherent in capitalism as a theory and acknowledging the psychic and sociocultural costs of capitalism as currently practiced, but insisting that capitalism as a social practice can be practiced differently. It remains to be demonstrated that education that supports these meso-practices is similarly imaginable and practicable. That task requires more attention than I can give it here; below I offer some promissory notes sketching a direction to proceed.

As I noted at the outset, we are all capitalists and so are the children we bring into this place and time. We enact the practices of buying and selling, of making and consuming, goods and services – but also ourselves. Even when we are workers in the Marxist idiom, we leverage our human capital to produce wealth – too often decreasing levels of wealth for ourselves and increasing levels of wealth for those who can purchase our productivity. If we are fortunate enough to find that our human capital commands a high return on investment and are able to acquire wealth, (that is, resources beyond what are needed for survival), then we become capitalists in Marx’s sense as well, owning our own usually tiny and typically meaningless slice of the means of production as we invest in individualized retirement funds.

However, our children will not become constructive capitalists by observing and participating in the currently common practices of consuming, laboring and saving. For these are passive practices that discourage risk-taking and encourage constrained choice and compliance. And diminished risk-taking and compliance cannot a capitalist make! To enact capitalism constructively our children must first experience the mechanisms of capitalism in a lively way.

It is important to note that the criteria for constructive capitalism outlined here are *dispositions*, each a nexus of idea, feeling and act, not simply cognitive or affective or behavioral. To develop these dispositions will require a kind of educational experience (in Dewey’s terms) that takes action, consequence and reflection into account in the service of understanding and future action. It will require practice buying and selling, making and consuming, employing and being employed – and even speculating and investing. Immediate, short-term and long-term inquiries into ventures with a careful analysis of the outcomes and reflection on the impact – including the psychic and affective impact – all seem crucial to educating those who can enact capitalism constructively. It will require educating for uncertainty and learning how to practice living with the conditions that can go to fear all too quickly.
It should be obvious that educating capitalists cannot only go on in schools, in part because schools as they are currently constituted dessicate possibilities for a vital and distributed capitalism. Learning in most school today – public, private or charter – is a commodified practice where exchange metaphors mask discussion and both teachers and learners confuse recitation for discussion (Lave and McDermott, 2002; Backer, 2013). But even were we to address the possibilities in schools, educating capitalists will have to move out into neighborhoods and workplaces, into media and social spaces, both because adults are as much in need of this education as are children and because those spaces offer possibilities for practicing a robust capitalism, for taking chances, for enjoying the rewards of one's ventures well launched and for rebounding from those ventures that crash and burn. The adults who are living in liquid fear are not capable of the dispositions that enacting capitalism constructively requires; the children don't know what it is to sell lemonade on one street corner where there is lots of traffic or on another where no one passes by.

To understand capitalism as a social practice is to live it, to analyze it and to critique it. It requires reading Milton Friedman and Paul Krugman, Ayn Rand and Karl Marx. It means subscribing to Fortune Magazine and Mother Jones. It involves working for “the man” and making not much money; it means striking it rich even in a constrained situation like Monopoly. It means being an entrepreneur, selling lemonade on the corner, offering lawn mown services in the neighborhood or creating a new app for the smart phone – without anybody else paying you to do so. It means studying economics and studying literature and studying philosophy and studying history. It means studying the mathematics that gave us calculus and the science that gave us previously unthinkable new products like replacement hips and manufactured soft chocolate chip cookies and disposable diapers, as well as technology that gave us spreadsheets. And then it means having the time to talk about it all.

In other words, we would do well to educate young people not to get into college – where students are still under the thumb of folks like us, employment of a kind where grades are the wages and commodification is a danger -- but to get into the free market where lie both opportunity for growth and the danger of being demeaned.

There are models and resources out there to light this educational path. Stanford University’s Design School focuses on developing “empathy muscles” in the context of a design approach to making both products and money. Filmmakers and novelists like J.C. Chandor, Dave Eggers and Chang-Rae Lee) are offering modern day Dickensian lenses that tap affect constructively in concert with their conceptual and political reframing of our practice of capitalism.

Any effort to enact capitalism differently will be constrained by social, psychological, cultural, political and material conditions. Few employees are willing to stake their income as my father did on the outcome of their own efforts, a function of socialization that values playing it safe, of social policy that removes the critical aspects of the social safety net – like health care – that would enable risk-taking, and of the technical limitations of the tools we use to measure productivity and effectiveness. All of these conditions need to be reimagined and re-legislated as well.

Few will want to abandon a veneer of security in favor of the intentional (and difficult) practice of a double consciousness, a dual awareness that commodification of valued objects including my self is proceeding even as I am refusing that process, that I am both at risk and not at risk, that there is reason to fear but no reason to fear. That is both understandable and the state of affairs that educators have always encountered. Pursued with humility, this sort of education is both a tool for enacting capitalism differently and a different enactment of capitalism.

As educators, we have the opportunity and the responsibility to teach emerging capitalists that the free market is both useful and dangerous, and that the pursuit of profit can be tempered by investment in one's self and by awareness of and responsiveness to the other who represents my co-conspirator in the practice of capitalism. We have to sustain
ourselves and attend to those we are competing with in order to keep the competition underway. The argument for this is both moral and pragmatic. Yes, integrity enhances the moral quality of my life, but it also enhances my financial rewards, at least in the long run. Yes, the pursuit of profit enhances the financial quality of my life but only when it is a life lived wide awake to the power of diversity, the danger of commodification and the contingency of deservedness. Mutual responsibility creates the conditions of trust and reliability necessary for the pursuit of profits in open markets. Constructive capitalism is a practicable possibility; educating capitalists is a compelling call.

---

1 One might object that my father, the capitalist, gets to determine which circumstance is which and gets to control the terms of the game, reinscribing the power relations that a capitalist system requires. I think that this objection is substantially correct, but would also argue this: capitalism as an economic arrangement is both useful and dangerous. I accept its utility (psychologically as motivating active engagement but also politically, in its resistance of centralized control that is subject to corruption). And I am attempting here to short-circuit its danger through education, that is, to ensure that workers are neither cowed nor co-opted but understand their power in the game that is capitalism. The other-aware capitalist is more likely to resist the depersonalizing and demeaning demands of the “boss.” While the danger of patronizing action remains, possibilities for democratic political action are enhanced.

2 That is, when they attain a house with heat, a car that runs, enough good food, are connected to and in communication with the world, and can find a way to send their kids to college, they are OK. Of course, this is a high bar and the average worker in the US (earning $44,322 in 2012) will be hard pressed to provide this unless they are in a two-income family. Add more than one or two children and it would be utterly impossible.

3 There is a school district in the state of Pennsylvania in an affluent area that has an unspoken commitment to being the “best” school district in the state. This began as the outcome of a strong district with students from well-educated and generally well-off families and a teaching faculty that was highly regarded. They liked what they had and wanted to keep it, in part because their children benefitted in the higher education lottery and in part because of the positive impact on real estate prices. So they operationalized “best” as equivalent to “highest paid teachers.” Now on the one hand, this sounds really good, finally a district recognizing the impact of teachers on educational quality. On the other hand, here’s how it has played out. Whenever any other district raises their salary schedule so that any part of it rises above the “best,” “the best” jumps in and raise their salaries again, in the market equivalent of a bidding war. This constant upward trend has resulted in resentment toward the teachers. As a result, the taxpayers expect not just high test scores, but also high levels of “customer service” -- too often in the form of guaranteed high grades for their sons and daughters. The teachers are a commodity, students’ grades are a commodity, education is a commodity – and all can be bought and sold.

References


Thistle Farms: [http://www.thistlefarms.org](http://www.thistlefarms.org)

The Right to Vote and the Duty to Educate Oneself

Steinar Bøyum

I argue that democratic citizens have a duty to educate themselves politically. My argument proceeds in two stages. First, I assess Jason Brennan's provocative defense of epistocracy. I try to show that there is no notion of political competence that can meet with reasonable agreement among citizens and that voter qualification exams are therefore illegitimate. Second, I maintain that the basic premise of Brennan's argument, the right to a competent electorate, is valid and that it corresponds to an individual duty to educate oneself politically. This duty is, in Kant's terminology, a wide and imperfect duty that we owe to our fellow democratic citizens.

Educational Responses to Religious Pluralism: Reasonable Accommodation and the Charter of Quebec Values

Ryan Bevan, Michael Schapira

In this workshop, we explore the relationship between religious reasoning and open secularism in liberal-democratic, pluralistic societies, using the Province of Quebec as a case study. Quebec in particular offers a distinctly profuse perspective on the issue of religious integration due to its continued focus on the concept of reasonable accommodation and, more recently, the proposal by the Parti Quebecois government to initiate a Quebec Charter of Values, which urges the banning of religious symbols and clothing worn by public employees in the workplace.

Implications of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy for Learning and Teaching

Ian Cantley

This paper uses Wittgenstein's later philosophy to make the case that paradoxical difficulties attend the notion that learning established concepts is tantamount to getting mental entities in mind. Psychology and education have a tendency to treat human capacities as mental states, but the author argues that the capacity to participate in a range of disciplinary practices is the criterion for having learned an established concept. The author also questions the frequently encountered contention that teaching which involves training pupils to apply the paradigm examples of science and mathematics, for example, (what Dewey characterised as "pouring in") is little more than behavioural conditioning.

Agency in 'Retreat': Theorizing Resistance through Silence

Amy Chapman

This paper will consider questions of resistance in dialogue with concepts of retreat and silence. While a detailed engagement with the conceptual and analytic lineage of these
concepts is beyond the scope of this presentation, this paper offers an exploratory analysis through a consideration of empirical data collected in non-traditional learning spaces. Through a consideration of moments of ‘retreat’ and ‘silence’ in these classrooms, this presentation aims to stimulate discussion on education’s inability to fully attend to the affective domains of repression, defence and disavowal embodied in acts of student resistance.

_John White’s Radically Practical Conception of Educational Philosophy: An Assessment_

_Stefaan E. Cuypers_

This paper reflects on different conceptions of educational philosophy, their strengths and weaknesses. Against the backdrop of major alternatives, and the received view, delineated by R. S. Peters, John White’s recent radically practical conception is critically assessed. Notwithstanding a pluralist answer is given to the question ‘What is, can or ought philosophy of education to be?’, the paper advocates the asymmetrical dependence of all other conceptions upon the analytic conception of educational philosophy as the _primus inter pares_—the first among equals.

_Moral education and the common school: building on Wilson’s ‘New Introduction’_

_Richard Davies_

In 1990 John Wilson published a single authored response to the earlier multi-authored and multi-disciplinary ‘Introduction to Moral Education’. The ‘New Introduction’ set out a systematic approach to moral education suitable for schools. Wilson’s approach is, typically, analytic. He begins with a consideration of moral education's terms, namely, ‘morality’ and ‘education’. It is by being clear about these terms, he claims, that we are able to move forward in offering advice to teachers. Whilst agreeing with the potential of Wilson’s starting point and approach, nevertheless I end up with a different conclusion in two respects. Firstly, Wilson’s account of education does not go far enough. Thinking well is an important aspect, but so is _acting well_. In the case of morality it would seem particularly clear that ‘moral conduct’ is an important constitutive element in the aim of any educational programme. Secondly, he is unnecessarily pessimistic about the viability of a coherent, virtues account of morality as the foundation for moral education. Resolving these difficulties and building on Wilson’s work offers an alternative approach to moral education. In conclusion, however, I raise questions over whether this, or any form of moral education, is possible in the common school.

_Critical conversations in Philosophy of Education Seminar Series_

_Andrew Davis_

The series is designed to foster conversations between philosophers of education drawing on contrasting intellectual traditions. A workshop at the Oxford conference would afford an important opportunity to report progress to interested delegates, to receive any feedback that they would care to provide and to broaden the impact of the seminar discussions to a national and international audience. The seminar series can only achieve anything useful if the relevant discussions are ‘owned’ by relevant academic communities, and a conference workshop could afford an opportunity to further such an aspiration.
On the justification of physical education: Body-based mindfulness and R.S. Peters’ cognitive criteria

Oren Ergas, Christopher Martin

Mindfulness research has become an area of increasing focus in education research. This paper assesses the educational dimension of mindfulness via its application to the long-debated status of physical education (PE) as educationally worthwhile. We argue that previous attempts to justify PE as worthwhile have not been appropriately grounded in the most distinctive feature of those activities – the body. As an alternative approach, we claim that the practice of body-based mindfulness can help further articulate the meaning behind R.S. Peters’ claim that only activities that possess “wide-ranging cognitive content” are educationally worthwhile. By appealing to the cognitive theory underlying mindfulness practice we defend the view that the body is fundamental to our cognitive-affective processes. Based on the pedagogical scaffold of body-based mindfulness physical activity is justified as a powerful education of the emotions and rational agency.

The Wisdom of Clichés: Liberal Learning and the Burden of Originality

Kevin Gary

In this essay I contend the modern liberal arts emphasis on critical autonomy and originality is misguided. I argue that rather than being original, we are better served by learning how to embrace the wisdom of certain clichés. Rather than banal, empty truisms, certain clichés (better characterized as proverbs) can be prompts for thoughtful self-examination and wise action. Clichés are prominent and pedagogically significant within wisdom traditions. We are, however, conditioned by culture and by the liberal arts ideal of autonomy to reject anything that smacks of being clichéd. This pedagogical and conditioned aversion does us a great disservice. Rather than being educated to reject clichéd thinking and living outright, the pedagogical task should be one of equipping students to critically discern which clichés are the right clichés, embracing those that are constitutive of a wisdom tradition.

Education and Political Sacrifice

Ido Gideon

One key question in political education which so far has not been addressed sufficiently in philosophy of education is the nature and place of sacrifice in political education. Accounts of sacrifice feature prominently in many political cultures, and are evoked by events such as remembrance days and in history curricula. However, liberal educationalists seldom refer to sacrifice as component to the political sphere. The first part of the paper will propose a reason for this reluctance to engage with sacrifice, relating it to the nature of the liberal political sphere. A different understanding of the political in which sacrifice, especially at war, plays a major role and offers a view into the limitations of liberal discourse. The second part of the paper will examine the notion of “liberal patriotism”, to determine whether it in fact offers an account of sacrifice. The third and last part will offer an account of sacrifice as an essential part of political action, giving it both potency and resonance, and fostering political commitment.
**Locke on education for liberty and rational self-control**

**Atli Harðarson**

In this paper, I argue that Locke’s account of freedom in the second edition (and subsequent editions) of the Essay concerning human understanding gives us the key to understanding how his emphasis on habituation, conditioning and control in Some thoughts concerning education is consistent with his concern for liberty. I also argue that his ideal of freedom and rational self-control is a common thread that gives coherence to his major philosophical publications.

** Freedoms, danger, principles: academy schools in England**

**Ruth Heilbronn**

Academy schools in England are publicly-funded independent schools (DfE 2013a). Their creation is part of a raft of changes in education in England, resulting in ‘a system-wide shift in this provision, facilitated by the Academies Act 2010’ (West and Bailey 2013. p.139), an example of ‘policy borrowing’ (Winstanley 2012) involving privatisation of education in which schools function in the market place. The paper first describes the background to academy schools and examines the assumptions underlying their establishment. It next suggests how schools could be differently conceived, if we were starting from different assumptions about them, in relation to educational aims. This leads to considering the idea of education as a public service and the consideration of whether the academy school programme is eroding or destroying education as a public service, and if this is the case, does it matter? The paper then considers Dewey’s ‘common school’ through a 21st century lens, and through establishing education as a fundamentally normative endeavour, concludes that it does matter.

**Knowledge and the Space of Reasons**

**Geoffrey Hinchliffe**

In this paper I develop an epistemological perspective that argues for the central role that knowledge plays in education. I do this first of all by elaborating John McDowell’s ideas on the ‘space of reasons’. I then use this concept to re-interpret and develop the concept of the ‘forms of knowledge’ associated with Paul Hirst. I argue that the forms of knowledge can be seen as inhabiting the space of reasons. I then show how one of the key features of the space of reasons – the making of judgements – is also a key feature of education and learning.

**Open Access publication: some notes on visibility and making public**

**Naomi Hodgson**

The paper attempts to analyse the recent policy relating to open access publication in which it becomes a requirement of funding councils and future research excellence assessments in terms of the way in which the university and the researcher have been reconfigured in the context of the knowledge economy. Open access is explored in relation to both the opening up of the university and its constituent functions and the way in which new technologies and social media are constitutive of the researcher to explore how practices of visibility and
transparency operate in modes of governing and self-governing. The principle of making research accessible to the public through open access publication opens the question of how the public is understood in this relationship. Drawing on the work of Bruno Latour a distinction is drawn between publication as making visible and publication as making public.

Adorno and Cultural Education for Love and Resistance
Sharon Jessop

‘Culture’ is a chameleon word that colours itself with the context of its use. In an education context it is a prime subject for scrutiny as culture policy and cultural education become more important nationally in a rapidly changing political context. This paper conducts an examination of the analysis of the relation of culture and education in the work of Theodor Adorno. Adorno’s Marxian approach to cultural education, with its prescient attentiveness to the problems arising from advanced monopolistic capitalism and his commitment to concrete social goals, make it a rich source of ideas for a contemporary critique. He also points the way toward understanding cultural education as an ethically significant activity at the heart of the teaching relationship.

Emerson and Bildung: Self-Cultivation, Social Critique, Democracy
Viktor Johansson, Claudia Schumann, Heikki Kovalainen, Naoko Saito, Paul Standish

The aim of this symposium is to explore the specific connections of Ralph Waldo Emerson’s thought with the Bildung tradition from a historical as well as a systematic perspective. The papers draw out various historical lineages of thought leading from the German Romantic and new humanist development of the notion of Bildung to its American appropriation, to the converse influence of Emerson on continental thinkers such as Nietzsche, and further to the reception of Emerson’s thinking in both Europe and Asia. The discussion is meant to clarify the similarities and dissimilarities between Emersonian thought and the Bildung tradition. This can shed light on the way in which Emerson’s American appropriation of the concept makes an original contribution to educational thought and how reading Emerson as an American philosopher of democracy may help rethink local struggles for and with democracy, within and beyond inner and outer borders, in several national and transnational contexts. The symposium discusses Emerson’s ideas of self-reliance, growth, (self-)culture, and his critique of conformism in relation to conservative versus critical-progressive understandings of Bildung; how Emerson’s thinking relates to the often discussed problematic elitism of the Bildung tradition; the relationship between social critique and self-cultivation; how Emerson’s writings on these notions can problematise educational practices and policies in local and global contexts.

Aporia, Revelation and the Socratic Method: What Contemporary Educators Can Learn from Plato’s Lysis
Mark E. Jonas

While a great deal has been written on Plato’s Lysis in philosophy and philology journals over the last thirty years, nothing has been published on Lysis in the major Anglo-American philosophy of education journals during that time. Nevertheless, it deserves attention from educators for one of its most interesting features, namely that in it Socrates explicitly invites his interlocutors to watch as he engages in dialogue with Lysis, a young, beautiful aristocrat
who is the beloved of Hippothales, one of Socrates’ interlocutors. I argue that Lysis can serve as a model to educators who want to move their students beyond mere aporia, but also do not want to dictate answers to students. Although the dialogue ends in Socrates’s affirmation of aporia, his affirmation is actually meant to persuade his interlocutors to reflect on a subtle revelation of knowledge they had previously experienced. In what follows, I offer a close reading of relevant passages of the Lysis, demonstrating the way Socrates leads his interlocutors to revelation without forcing his answers upon them. I then conclude with some thoughts on the pedagogical implications that can be drawn from the dialogue.

The ‘New Synthesis in Moral Psychology’ versus Aristotelianism: Implications for Moral Education

Kristjan Kristjansson

The aim of this article is to explore some practical implications of recent developments in moral psychology aimed at psychologising morality: developments that Jonathan Haidt terms ‘the new synthesis’ (NS). As a prelude, I diagnose what in the content of the NS undergirds those implications and how it differs from the Aristotelian alternatives with which it is commonly contrasted. More specifically, I explore the NS’s take on moral motivation and moral domains. In both cases, I deem the response offered by the NS to radical rationalism hyperbolic and argue that Aristotelianism provides a more plausible, if more moderate, alternative. I conclude by addressing the putative social implications of the NS, both general implications for public morality and more specific implications for moral education at school.

The best laid schemes

Tone Kvernbekk

The context for my discussion is evidence-based practice (EBP), also known as the what works agenda. I settle for a minimal definition of EBP: the use of the best available evidence to achieve the best possible results for “client” and society. EBP is practical in nature and focuses on our acting to bring about desirable goals/results. The methods we use to bring about these results should be effective, and effectiveness (how well it works) is generally measured by the degree to which the method (strategy, policy, program) contributes to goal attainment. The major ambition of EBP is that our knowledge, which is evidence-based, should allow us to predict with reliability that use of a method will indeed bring about the results we wish to achieve. That is to say, our methods should be well laid schemes that work (well), and EBP aspires to tell us which schemes these are.

The Gadamer-Habermas debate and the concepts of tradition and authority in the philosophy of education

Anniina Leiviskä

This contribution examines the educational relevance of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s concepts of tradition and authority. The educational value of these concepts has been unacknowledged across the whole spectrum of philosophy of education, partly because of the conservative interpretation these were given by Jürgen Habermas in the famous Gadamer–Habermas debate. The contribution thus aims to show that Habermas’s interpretation of the concepts of tradition and authority is misleading, as it ignores the specific meanings these concepts have in the context of Gadamer’s critique of the Enlightenment and within the ontological
framework of philosophical hermeneutics. It is argued that when the concepts of tradition and authority are understood against this background, they provide an extremely fruitful ground for examining the dialectic of historical dependencies and transformative possibilities of education, as well as for illuminating the mutual dependency of these dimensions.

*Behold: Silence and Attention in Education*

**David Lewin**

Educators continually ask about the best means to engage students and how best to capture attention. These concerns often make the problematic assumption that students can directly govern their own attention. In order to address the role and limits of attention in education, some theorists have sought to recover the significance of silence or mindfulness in schools, but I argue that these approaches are too simplistic. A more fundamental examination of our conceptions of identity and agency reveals a Cartesian and Kantian foundationalism that encourages us to be overly optimistic about the agency of students in directing attention. I critically engage with these conceptions by drawing on a range of diverse sources, primarily modern Continental philosophy and Christian mystical theology.

*The Trouble with Assessment for Accountability*

**Gerard Lum**

Noting continuing public and professional anxiety about the use of assessment to hold schools and teachers to account, this paper revisits a longstanding debate on the issue and attempts to resolve an apparent impasse. Following on from an earlier paper in the *Journal of Philosophy of Education* I set out to show how the problem turns on the kind of assessment used, rather than, as has often been supposed, the kind of knowledge being assessed. Drawing on my earlier distinction between prescriptive and expansive modes of assessment, I argue that the only kind of assessment properly fit for this purpose is unsuitable for the task precisely because the people carrying the assessment are, ultimately, the very people being assessed.

*Art and Moral Understanding*

**Roger Marples**

This paper is critical of those who would deny that artworks are capable of providing us with knowledge that is not trivial. Artworks, it is argued, have the capacity provide important imaginative insights by acquainting us with characters and situations by reference to which we may understand what it is like to experience and to feel, in ways very different from that with which we may be familiar. Not only does art afford the opportunity to acquire self-knowledge and understanding it is instrumental in enabling us to refine our moral concepts and to determine what is salient from the moral point of view. As a powerful tool in the education of the emotions, artworks have the power to increase our moral sensitivity and to sharpen our perception of what is required of us, in ways that are unique and otherwise unobtainable.
The family as ‘gathering’: re-visiting the pedagogical dimension of parenting in view of the socio-material turn

Philippe Noens

Etymologically, in Dutch ‘family’ (gezin) derives from ‘ghesinde’ which meant ‘a group of people undertaking a journey’ (Philippe e.a., 2009). A ‘ghesinde’ was composed of people related to one another by kinship, allegiance, servitude and (financial) dependence. More specifically, family referred to a gathering of people who (figuratively and literally) moved in the same direction. Undeniably, ever since its first appearance the family has undergone significant transformations as has our understanding of what the pedagogical role of the family should be (e.g., cope with sickness, regulate sexuality, or socialize children).

Dialogical Teaching and the Varieties of Telling

Graham Nutbrown

Advocates of dialogical teaching take insufficient account of the importance of telling – that is, of what epistemologists call “testimony”. Often testimonial teaching and learning – learning from what others tells us – is disparaged as epistemically inferior and as passive, even as irrational. Advocates of dialogical teaching share with liberal philosophers of education, such as Hirst and Peters, a hesitancy concerning the rationality of telling. Recent accounts of testimony have emphasized the role of trust in learning from the words of others and therefore rightly stress the intersubjectivity involved, but they conflate different speech acts and therefore underestimate how much active interpretation is involved in grasping speakers’ intentions. What matters most is that education allows children to develop the cognitive capacities and virtues - sensitivity to language, integrity in communication, responsibility and consistency in epistemic judgement - that allow them to talk and learn successfully in dialogue with others.

Learning as the passage From Icon to Argument or why do Students have Teachers (or learning as falling in love)

Alin Olteanu

This paper proposes a semiotic model for the student/teacher relation, contributing to the recent edusemiotics developments (inter alia Stables 2005, 2012, Pikkarainen 2011, Semetsky 2009, Pesce 2011). According to Charles Peirce the Argument is the fully developed sign type, being realized at the level of Agapasm while the Icon is the basic sign type that affords learning. Learning is here presented as the semiotic passage from Icon to Argument. Following Peirce’s semiotics the present paper presents an I/Thou model for the student/teacher relation, as the phenomenological school (Husserl, Heidegger, Levinas) developed as well. This semiotic model is here developed in four stages, each investigating: (1) the role of Icons in learning, (2) the phenomenon of discovery, (3) learning as suprasubjective discovery, and (4) the discovery of the other in the student/teacher relation. The passage from Icon to Argument is a suprasubjective phenomenon of meaning which is possible through the search for the genuine other both from the part of the student and from that of the teacher. The paper explains how semiotics offers a holistic view of education, whereas life forms are a part of learning itself.
"What The Papers Say ..."  Hierarchies of Symbolism and their Consequences for the Teaching of Reading

Harriet Pattison

This paper explores the philosophy of language informing pedagogical approaches to reading by examining the postulated relationships between thought, speech and writing. In particular it explores the current and strongly held notion underlying phonetic approaches to reading which maintains that writing is speech in symbolic form. It looks at the metaphysical and philosophical assumptions which have led to the domination of this theory in reading education and puts forward the argument that different philosophical views of what reading is would allow different theories of learning to read to surface. It also considers evidence that children themselves may sometimes hold different ideas (philosophical theories) about what reading is, suggesting that where this is the case reading education would be more helpful if it were able to take this into account.

Critical thinking and self-knowledge

Fredy Hernan Prieto Galindo

Currently, the ability to «think critically» is considered to be a central aim of contemporary education (Bailin and Siegel, 2003; Winch, 2006; Siegel, 2010; Lay, 2011), as it could contribute greatly to democracy by taking people to autonomy and responsibility. So, following this idea, Colombian education policies (Isaza, 1994) have taken as one of the main objectives to train children and youths on critical thinking.

The target of this paper is to examine the Critical Thinking Movement's (henceforth CTM) concept of Critical Thinking, since it seems to be widely extended nowadays in Hispanic countries (Difabio, 2005), including Colombia. It will be argued that this philosophical concept of Critical Thinking has been grounded on one assumption truly problematic: the requirement of direct and almost infallible self-knowledge. That is, a critical thinker knows himself, his own mental states (like beliefs, desires, prejudices, biases, etc.) in a way that he does not need to develop any process of inference and it is exempted from error, hence he can trust in his self-knowledge to judge his own arguments and decisions. He trusts in his self-knowledge to be autonomous, but what if instead of self-knowledge there is self-deception in his critical thinking?

This reflection will be split into two sections: 1) the concept of critical thinking will be explained from its main components: the assessment component and the critical spirit. 2) Then, I will deal with the main points of self-knowledge and its relation to critical thinking.

Citizenship, work and the idea of the university

Natalia Sánchez, Andrés Mejia

The universities of our times face great pressures from industries and corporations to educate skilled workers who are well adapted to the market. At the same time, the university is seen by many as an institution that should educate individuals who can flourish as well as advance democracy and contribute to the wellbeing of their communities. Notably in Arendt's analysis, these two conditions are separated in such a way that work is devoid of the ethical and political possibilities of what she calls action. Arguing against this separation, we advance here a proposal that takes as a starting point the acknowledgement of the role of
the university as an educator of workers. But work is politicised in such a way that the university will educate citizens because it is educating workers.

*Teaching by example. What it means for teachers to be role models*

**Wouter Sanderse**

Teachers generally consider role modelling to be an important ‘method’ to stimulate pupils’ moral development, but they are confused about what this means. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to critically assess what teachers can learn about ‘teaching by example’ from Warnick’s 2008-book *Imitation and Education*. First, it will be explained why ‘role modelling’ is a popular but at the same time problematic notion in education. Second, four controversial assumptions about teaching by example will be critically examined: (1) that teachers need to be virtuous in order to be role models, (2) that individual teachers can chose to be an example, (3) that all role modelling is and should be imitative, and (4) that human exemplars are the final criteria of right and wrong. Third, the merits of Warnick’s book for educational practice will be evaluated. While Warnick argues that it is difficult for individual teachers to be an ‘example’ of a virtue, he points out that they do ‘model’ moral behaviour all of the time. By drawing on the work of virtue ethicists, this imitative account of role modelling is questioned. Moreover, Warnick is criticised for not addressing the normative question what kind of modelling is morally desirable.

*On the idea that education should help us come to terms with life’s ultimate pointlessness*

**Anders Schinkel**

In a short text about the aims of education, Richard Peters wrote that “[o]ur basic predicament in life is to learn to live with its ultimate pointlessness” and that “the most important dimension of education is that in which we learn to come to terms with the pointlessness of life.”

My primary purpose in this paper is to show why we need not accept this claim. Beyond that I will also briefly suggest some reasons why we should not accept it – why it would be wrong (and not just unnecessary) to do so. My argument will lead to a different conclusion about what education should help us come to terms with: not life’s (supposed) ultimate pointlessness, but the ineradicability of doubt about life’s ultimate meaning. Finally, I will suggest that education also has a more positive role to play here than just to help people accept certain aspects of the human condition.

*’Bildung, the Space of Reasons, and the Educational Aim of Autonomy’*

**Harvey Siegel, Michael Hand, Paul Standish**

This symposium addresses issues raised by David Bakhurst’s *The Formation of Reason*. Central topics to be addressed include the adequacy of Bakhurst’s account of autonomy and his case for regarding it as the basic aim of education, the relationship between autonomy and rationality, and the place of Bildung in the forming of minds and the psychology of learning. While all three symposiasts express admiration for Bakhurst’s book, the symposium is intended to be a critical appreciation; all three raise substantial challenges.
Serious Words for Serious Subjects

Adrian Skilbeck

In this paper I create philosophical space for the importance of how we say things as an adjunct to the attention we pay to what is said. In the light of this I assess claims that are made for the contribution drama can make to moral education. In Plato’s dialogue *Euthyphro*, Socrates asks what kind of disagreement causes hatred and anger. The answer is disagreement on moral questions. The consequent ethical conditioning of such speech might demand that our seriousness is marked by calm, respectful and open conversation. Drawing on Stanley Cavell’s discussion of Ibsen’s play *A Doll’s House*, I argue that this might fail to fully reflect how an individual takes their life seriously and how passionate speech such as we find in dramatic dialogue can communicate this. I develop the register of moral perfectionism that Cavell identifies in the play in relation to moral seriousness. I argue that the drama classroom can help, not by bringing out the inherently dramatic and conflictual nature of moral dilemmas as ‘hard cases’ but through heightened awareness that the personal voice, the individual’s moral presence in his/her thought, is in part located in possibilities of that thought’s physical expression.

Philosophy, Literature, and Education

Richard Smith, James Conroy, Bob Davis, Liam Gearon, Sharon Todd

In the early 1970s, UNESCO established a committee whose task was to formulate proposals for a global policy of education. In the resulting report, the Committee emphasized the principle of ‘lifelong learning’. If democratic cultural participation and personal autonomy should be maintained in a scientific and technically mediated world, the educational practice had to be expanded. It should include an expanding of the institutionalized learning environments, i.e. that you also have to learn at work and at leisure. The existing educational systems in their seclusion from the world of labour were not appropriate any more. The European Council and the OECD draw Unesco’s suggestions further, albeit with a significant commercial priority. First and foremost the aim was to develop flexible and dynamic in-service training opportunities. Thus, an OECD report from 1973 presented the concept of ‘a system of recurrent education’. This means a system that made it possible for the individual life-long to shift between labour and education. Economic growth and development through new educational opportunities was one of the leading principles. A coherent policy planning came into focus, combining educational activities after school age with adaptation of compulsory schooling to the labour market. Here OECD went a step further than Unesco. Unesco’s early discussions may have seemed almost utopian. In contrast, since the 1990s, the OECD’s proposals transformed itself into the Bologna and Lisbon processes, which quite unexpectedly have proved to be able to lift education in Europe and in large parts of the world out of the usual national frameworks and to defy established pedagogical and academic ideals.

Panel Presentation: Education in a Post-Metaphysical World: Reflections on Christopher Martin’s Program of a Shared, Public Understanding of Education

Krassimir Stojanov, Christopher Martin, Johnston James Scott, Judith Suissa, Okshevski Walter

Christopher Martin’s recently published, *Education in a Post-Metaphysical World* attempts the seemingly impossible: to draw from a differentiated set of educational concepts residing in the public sphere, a normative conception of moral obligation and rightness (14-15). While
one might think this project doomed from the start, owing to what seem to be vastly different conceptual articulations of education occupying the public sphere. Martin argues forcefully that an ethic of obligation can be reconstructed from this outward cacophony of rival positions. Martin uses Jürgen Habermas’ theory of Discourse Ethics, as well as the tradition of conceptual analysis in philosophy of education and with a particular focus on the works of R.S. Peters, to offer a set of claims regarding the nature and look of an ethics of obligation that can be of use to educational policy and practice. Key issues to be addressed include the applicability of Martin’s educationalist reading of Discourse Ethics to educational policies and their material conditions (Suissa), the limits of a deliberative conception of educational moral rights and duties for pluralistic societies (Okshevsky), Martin’s critical interpretation of R.S. Peters theory of justification (Johnston), as well as some desiderata of Martin’s educationalist modification of the model of Discourse Ethics (Stojanov).

Reconstituting an ethics of care and its implications for critical pedagogy

Yusef Waghid

Philosophy of education has always been concerned with an ethics of care and how the latter impacts learning. I revisit two prominent views on an ethics of care: firstly, Nell Noddings’s (2002; 2006) notion of ethical caring that insists on a responsive relationship amongst those who care (carers) and cared-for to the extent that the latter’s autonomy seems to be restricted; and secondly, Michael Slote’s (2007) notion of empathetic caring that accentuates mutually engaging and respectful relationships amongst people. An ethics of care in relation to ethical (sympathetic) and empathetic caring is not enough on the basis that non-autonomous and mutually respectful relationships amongst people are insufficient to engender critical pedagogy. Pedagogy, if framed within a non-autonomous and engaging ethics of care, might not evoke the potentialities of learners to come towards their own understandings. Drawing on Jacques Rancière’s (1999) view of acting with equality and disruption, an ethics of care is reconstituted as to instill in learners a sense of ‘coming into presence’ – that is, allowing them to ‘speak’ autonomously without necessarily being told what to do.

Beyond the Prism - Reflections on Cosmopolitanism in Education

Ruth Wareham, Eli Vinokur, Claudia Schumann, Yuzo Hirose

The past 20 years have seen a huge rise in the popularity of educational accounts which draw on the ideal of cosmopolitanism. Indeed, the ubiquity of such accounts has led some theorists to move away from the notion that cosmopolitanism represents some sort of alternative perspective (Waldron, 1992) and enquire whether there is a sense in which we are all cosmopolitans now (Callan, 2005). Nevertheless, while cosmopolitanism is a term which has gained significant currency in modern educational discourse, it is also a chimerical term; deployed in such a myriad of ways that it is often difficult to gauge how philosophers of education might put it to use.

By considering contemporary philosophy of education through (and, ultimately, beyond) the cosmopolitan prism (Hansen, 2008), this symposium seeks to build upon the work of students at the 2013 PESGB Postgraduate Summer School and explore the ramifications of a cosmopolitan outlook on educational discourse and practice. The session will consist of three paper presentations. Presenter one will offer a vision of cosmopolitanism as an integral ideal and presenter two will consider the implications of this position relative to the issue of separate religious schooling. Presenter three will attempt to re-characterize contemporary discussions of cosmopolitan education through the key concepts of space, place and
Examining examining

John White

In an exam-saturated culture, it is easy to imagine that we know what examining involves. In a ground-clearing exercise for a later more comprehensive look at the role of examinations in the school system, this paper questions that assumption. It first explores what examining in general entails, looking at examples like investigating a philosophical theory or examining a sick patient. The conclusion from this the longest of the four sections is that what we take examining to be in the case of school exams appears to diverge in several ways from the general concept. The second section discusses what testing is and how it differs from examining. The third turns to self-examination and to non-cognitive aspects of examining, briefly sketching their relation to religious ideas in the backstory of modern education. The final section, like the third one, opens up issues to be pursued further elsewhere, in this case about whether examinations as we know them merit a place in our schools.

In Excess of Epistemology: Siegel, Taylor, Heidegger and the Conditions of Thought

Emma Williams

Harvey Siegel’s epistemologically-informed conception of critical thinking is one of the most influential accounts of critical thinking around today. In this paper, I seek to open up an alternative account of critical thinking to that defended by Siegel. I do this by re-reading an opposing view, which Siegel himself rejects as leaving epistemology (and, by implication, his epistemological account of critical thinking) “pretty much as it is”. This is the view proposed by Charles Taylor in his paper “Overcoming Epistemology”. Crucially, my aim here is not to defend Taylor’s challenge to epistemology per se, but rather to demonstrate how, through its appeal to certain key tropes within Heideggerian philosophy, Taylor’s paper opens us towards a radically different conception of thinking and the human being who thinks. Indeed, as will be argued, it is through this that Taylor and Heidegger come to offer us the resources for re-thinking the nature of critical thinking – in a way that exceeds the epistemological, and does more justice to receptive and responsible conditions of human thought.

Learning to See with Different Eyes: Nietzsche on the Pedagogy of Perspectival Empathy

Douglas Yacek

The concept of the perspective is employed ubiquitously in democratic education. Modern democratic societies are home to the most diverse religious, political and ethical perspectives, and many theorists consider it an essential aim of democratic education to teach students to see the world through these various perspectives. But what exactly does it mean to see through the perspectives of others, and how might students learn this ‘perspectival empathy’ in the school? Although educational dialogue is often the recommended pedagogical method for teaching perspectival empathy, I argue that the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche challenges this tradition. In this paper, I look to Nietzsche’s educational philosophy to derive a tripartite Nietzschean pedagogy of perspectival empathy founded upon self-knowledge, foreign language learning, and experimentalism. In light of the robustness of Nietzsche’s pedagogy, I conclude that its application requires engagement
with perspectives not just in dialogue, but across the democratic curriculum and, indeed, beyond.

*The Aims of Education and the Leap of Freedom*

**Suninn Yun**

This paper considers the place of freedom in discussions of the aims of education. Bearing in mind remarks of R.S. Peters to the affect that the singling out of aims can 'fall into the hands of rationalistically minded curriculum planners', it begins by considering the views of Roland Reichenbach regarding *Bildung* and his account of this in a-teleological terms. The particular place of freedom is examined in the light of the writings of Martin Heidegger and Jean-Luc Nancy. I discuss the meaning of education in terms of 'the leap of freedom'. This opens the way to an account of education that is different from classical notion of educational aims. Finally, the relation between the leap of freedom and developmental aspects of learning will be considered via examples of educational practice considered by Andrea English and Duck-Joo Kwak.
Travel and Accommodation Information

Travel to Oxford
For full information and links to timetables and for maps, go to http://www.visitoxford.org/info-travel.asp

Train
Trains run direct to Oxford from London (approximately one hour on the express service and from Birmingham International (approximately 90 minutes). Details of rail travel are on 08457 484950 and www.nationalrail.co.uk. Please note that there is no direct bus service from the railway station to New College. It is walkable from the station (about 20 mins); a taxi costs around £6.

Bus
Direct buses are available from major London airports to Oxford, costing around £20-£25:
- Heathrow (generally every 30 minutes, travel time around 90 mins)
- Gatwick (generally once and hour, travel time around 120 mins)
For full information, see: http://www.oxfordbus.co.uk/index.php

The Oxford Tube and the OxfordExpress (sic) run from various stops in London, such as Victoria and Marble Arch. They cost around £15 return and the journey is about 100 minutes.

Car
Please be warned that there is no parking available in New College and public car parks in Oxford are not cheap! If you have special mobility needs, please contact our administrators (pesgb@sasevents.co.uk).

If you are coming to the conference for one day only, the best option is to use the Thornhill Park and Ride (at Sandhills, east of the city). The Park and Ride bus will drop you on the High Street, about five minutes walk from New College. Further information can be found at: http://www.oxford.gov.uk/PageRender/decTS/Park_and_Ride_occw.htm

On Foot from the City Centre
The City Centre to New College will take between 5-10 minutes. Most local bus stops are located on Cornmarket and Queen Street, and national buses arrive at Gloucester Green Bus Station on George Street. From any of these, you should make your way to Broad Street (opposite Debenhams). Continue to the end of Broad Street, (past the Sheldonian Theatre on the right). At the traffic lights go straight on into Holywell Street. New College is on your right, just past the Mansfield Road junction.

On Foot from the Railway Station
It is a 20-30 minute walk from the train station to the College, and so you may prefer to take a taxi. If walking, turn left as you leave the station area. The Royal Oxford Hotel is directly in front of you; keep left and walk along Hythe Bridge Street. At the end walk straight across into George Street. At the end of George Street the Debenhams Store is on the left - from here, walk straight over into Broad Street and follow the directions as from the City Centre.
On Arrival
Please report to the porters at the Holywell Street entrance of New College on your arrival. The porters will be able to issue your room key and direct you both to your room and to the Conference Office.

All rooms have bed linen towels, soap and an international voltage razor socket. Rooms have internet access, but you will need to supply your own ethernet cable.

Note – warm clothes and exercise!
There is heating – but be warned that Oxford can be quite cold in March. Don’t be fooled by the Spring sunshine; pack a warm sweater!

If you are a keen athlete, please bring your running shoes; there is a hearty group of delegates who meet at the College entrance for a pre-breakfast run on Saturday morning (and occasionally on Sunday too). Look out for further details in the Conference Office.

Once you have settled in please report to the Conference Office for registration (open from 14:00 on Friday). If you have not yet paid your fee, you will be required to do so at registration.

The conference begins formally with a presentation from Wiley entitled ‘A beginner’s guide to getting published in journals’ which commences at 15.15. This is followed by the Called Poster Session in the Junior Common Room (and outside if the weather is fine), which opens at 15.45, the same time as afternoon tea. The first plenary session is at 16.45 in the Holywell Music Rooms, a few hundred metres walk from New College Porters’ Lodge.

For further information about New College please see: http://www.new.ox.ac.uk/

First time and experienced visitors alike may be interested in the visitors’ guide found at: http://www.new.ox.ac.uk/system/files/Tourist20Leaflet.pdf as well as the history of the College: http://www.new.ox.ac.uk/history-of-new-college-oxford

Please Note
Some New College students leave a few possessions in their room over the vacation. If the students’ possessions affect your use of the room, please contact the conference office and we will endeavour to resolve any problems. Please do not move students’ possessions.

Please also note that smoking in rooms (even leaning out of the window) is not allowed and delegates infringing this rule may be asked to leave New College.

Emergency Telephone Numbers
New College Porters: 01865 279 555
Conference Office / Administration: 07872 600 187
Telephone Service

Freephone Calls
You can call any 0800 number free of charge.

Outgoing Calls
Outgoing calls may be made using most telephone cards, including BT’s Chargecard plus, Dog&Bone etc available from many newsagents. Dial 9 for an outside line. The Porters Lodge has a limited supply of phone cards which are usable with your credit card.

Incoming Calls
The telephone number for callers outside the University is 0870 120 0870. This will be answered by an auto-attendant which will prompt the caller for your extension number. Calls to this number will be charged at national rates.

Faults
If you have a fault on your line, first try plugging an instrument which is known to be good into your telephone socket (borrow one from a neighbour). If this proves that the line, rather than the telephone, is faulty you should report the fault to the Porters Lodge.

Assistance
If you need help, dial 1234. This will be answered by the University Telecomms Section Help Desk (office hours only).

Internal Calls
Internal calls (extension to extension) are free of charge. Just dial the extension number (2xxxx, 3xxxx, 7xxxx or 8xxxx) without any prefix.

New College Smoking Policy

In accordance with the law, all New College buildings and enclosed spaces will be non-smoking, including bedrooms, common rooms – and even the bar.

Smoking will only be permitted in designated areas in the College grounds, as follows:

1) On the main College site – at the bottle recycling area along the Slype, and in the gardens but not within five metres of any building.

2) At the Sports Ground – at the refuse area.

The Governing Body has taken a policy decision to go further than the law requires, and the policy applies to everyone – visitors, delegates, students and staff.

The co-operation of all will be appreciated.
New College IT

This sheet provides information on connecting laptops and computers to the College network and where you can find IT resources.

COLLEGE WORKSTATIONS
There are 3 computers available in the Junior Common Room. They have Internet access 24 hours a day.

Your user name and password will be available for collection at the Porters' Lodge upon check-in.

PERSONAL COMPUTERS/LAPTOPS
To use the College network you must have:

- Up-to-date antivirus software
- Up-to-date operating system
- An ethernet/network card (or socket on your computer)
- An ethernet lead or cable

These items must be brought with you - we are unable to provide delegates with any items listed. It is possible to buy hardware from retailers in Oxford but we recommend purchasing it before you arrive. You may already have an Ethernet/Network socket on your laptop/computer. If you are not sure you should check the manual or the supplier’s web site.

ACCOMMODATION
Each room in the College has an Ethernet/Network socket. This will allow you to connect your own laptop/computer to the Internet. There is limited access to the wireless network available in rooms.

NETWORK SETTINGS
We use automatic IP addressing at the college so you may need to change your network settings to automatic. Please ask for help if you are not sure how to configure your laptop/computer.

REGISTRATION

Network/Ethernet

If you wish to connect to the Internet you must register your laptop/computer. Follow these steps to register:

1. Plug your laptop in to the network socket in your room/lecture room.
2. Open your web browser (i.e. Internet Explorer) and type in a website address/URL.
3. You will be prompted with the following registration screen click continue:
4. Read and agree to the terms and conditions

5. Enter your username and password and click on Login

6. You will be asked to wait for 60 seconds and then close down your web browser.
7. Open your web browser and you should have Internet access

You will only need to register once for the network/Ethernet.

**Wireless**

Most lecture rooms, the library and all common rooms have wireless. Our network is called *NewCollegeWireless*. We do not recommend using other wireless networks.

To register for the wireless network please disconnect your Ethernet/network plug and follow the same instructions as above. Wireless sessions last for approximately 12 hours before you will be asked to re-register.

**CONTACT DETAILS**

Email: it-support@new.ox.ac.uk
Telephone: 01865 289094
VISIT: IT OFFICE IN 8OB1
CONTACT: LUCILA CANOS-BOTOS OR SAM BROWN
Oxford Hotel Information

**Acorn House**
Contact: Nest Lewis
Address: 260-262 Iffley Road, Oxford, OX4 1SE
Tel: (01865) 247998 Fax: (01865) 247998 Email: acorn_gh_oxford@freezone.co.uk
**Grade:** Acorn House is graded as 3 Diamond. Member of Oxford Hotel and Guest House Association.

**Arden Lodge**
Address: 34 Sunderland Avenue, (off Banbury Road), Oxford, OX2 8DX
Tel: (01865) 552076 / 07702068697
**Grade:** Arden Lodge is graded as 3 Diamond.

**Beaumont Guest House**
Address: 234 Abingdon Road, Oxford, OX1 4SP
Tel: (01865) 241767 Fax: (01865) 241767 Email:info@beaumont.sagehost.co.uk
**Grade:** Beaumont Guest House is graded as 3 Diamond. Member of Oxford Association of Hotels and Guest Houses.

**Balkan Lodge Hotel The**
Contact: Mr J B Parojcic
Address: 315 Iffley road, Oxford, OX4 4AG
Tel: (01865) 244524 Fax: (01865) 251090 Email:balkanlodge@aol.co.uk
**Grade:** Balkan Lodge Hotel is graded as 2 Star. Member of Oxford Hotel and Guest House Association.

**Bath Place Hotel**
Address: 4 & 5 Bath Place, Oxford, OX1 3SU
Tel: (01865) 791812 Fax: (01865) 791834 Email:bathplace@compuserve.com
**Grade:** Bath Place Hotel is graded as 4 Diamond.

**Best Western Linton Lodge**
Address: 11-13 Linton Road, (off Banbury Road), Oxford, OX2 6UJ
Tel: (01865) 553461/ 510902 Fax: (01865)310365 Email:sales@lintonlodge.com
**Grade:** Best Western Linton Lodge is graded as 3 Star. Member of Oxford Hotel & Guest House Association.

**Burlington House**
Address: 374 Banbury Road, Summertown, Oxford, OX2 7PP
Tel: (01865) 513513 Fax: (01865) 311785 Email:stay@burlington-house.co.uk
**Grade:** Burlington House is graded as 5 Diamond Silver.

**Cotswold House**
Address: 363 Banbury Road, Oxford, OX2 7PL
Tel: (01865) 310558 Fax: (01865) 310558 Email:rwalker@talk21.com
**Grade:** Cotswold House is graded as 5 Diamond.
Eastgate Hotel
Address: Merton Street, Oxford, OX1 4BE
Tel: 0870 400 8201 Fax: (01865) 791681 Email:info@eastgate-hotel.com
Grade: Eastgate Hotel is graded as 3 Star.

Express by Holiday Inn Oxford
Address: Kassam Stadium, Grenoble Road, Oxford, OX4 4XP
Tel: (01865) 780888 Fax: (01865) 780999 Email:reservations@expressoxford.com

Head of the River
Address: Folly Bridge, St Aldates, Oxford, OX1 4LB
Tel: (01865) 721600 Fax: (01865) 726158
Grade: Head of the River is graded as 4 Diamond.

Marlborough House Hotel
Contact: Mrs K Pal Address: 321 Woodstock Road, Oxford, OX2 7NY
Tel: (01865) 311321 Fax: (01865) 515329 Email:enquiries@marlhousenewton.co.uk
Grade: Marlborough House Hotel is graded as 4 Sparkling Diamond.

Old Bank Hotel
Address: 92-94 High Street, Oxford, OX1 4BN
Tel: (01865) 799599 Fax: (01865) 799598 Email:info@oldbank-hotel.co.uk
Grade: Old Bank Hotel is graded as 4 Star Gold. Member of Oxford Hotel and Guest House Association.

Old Parsonage Hotel
Address: 1 Banbury Road, Oxford, OX2 6NN
Tel: (01865) 310210 Fax: (01865) 311262 Email:info@oldparsonage-hotel.co.uk
Grade: Old Parsonage Hotel is graded as 4 Star Silver.

Oxford Hotel
Address: Wolvercote Roundabout, Wolvercote, Oxford, OX2 8AL
Tel: (01865) 489988 Fax: (01865) 489952 Email:oxfordreservations@paramount-hotels.co.uk
Grade: Oxford Hotel is graded as 4 Star.

Parklands Hotel
Contact: Gary Lane Address: 100 Banbury Road, Oxford, OX2 6JU
Tel: (01865) 554374 Fax: (01865) 559860 Email:theparklands@freenet.co.uk
Grade: Parklands Hotel is graded as 4 Diamond. Member of Oxford Hotel and Guest House Association.

Victoria House Hotel
Address: 29 George Street, Oxford, OX1 2AY
Tel: (01865) 727400 Fax: (01865) 727402 Email:info@victoriahouse-hotel.co.uk
Grade: Victoria House Hotel is graded as 4 Diamond.
Randolph Hotel The
Address: Beaumont Street, Oxford, OX1 2LN
Tel: 0870 400 8200 Fax: (01865) 791678 Email: info@therandolphhotel.com
Grade: The Randolph Hotel is graded as 4 Star.

Royal Oxford Hotel
Address: Park End Street, Oxford, OX1 1HR
Tel: (01865) 248432 Fax: (01865) 250049 Email:reservations@royaloxfordhotel.co.uk
Grade: Royal Oxford Hotel is graded as 4 Diamond.

Westgate Hotel
Address: 1 Botley Road, Oxford, OX2 0AA
Tel: (01865) 726721 Fax: (01865) 722078
Grade: Westgate Hotel is graded as 2 Diamond. Member of Oxford Hotel and Guest House Association.