

WIN-WIN-WIN APPROACHES TO ACCOUNTABLE CARE How Physicians, Hospitals, Patients, & Payers Can All Benefit from Healthcare Payment and Delivery Reform and How AMGA Members Can Lead the Way

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


Goals of Today's Presentation

- How to Eliminate the Federal Deficit
- How to Double Physicians' Pay (While Reducing Healthcare Spending)
- How to Make Physicians Want to Create a (True) ACO and Make It Successful
- How to Help Americans Live Longer, Healthier Lives



Healthcare Spending Is the Biggest Driver of Federal Deficits






Federal Cost Containment Policy Choices






If It's A Choice of Rationing or Rate Cuts, Which is More Likely?





Medicare Payments to Physicians Below Inflation for a Decade







Payers try to get bigger so they can demand bigger discounts from providers



Payers try to get bigger so they can demand bigger discounts from providers

Providers try to get bigger so they can demand higher fees from payers



Payers try to get bigger so they can demand bigger discounts from providers

Providers try to get bigger so they can demand higher fees from payers

Getting bigger doesn't mean better or lower cost care for patients



What We Need: A Way to Reduce Costs Without Rationing or Fee Cuts



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It Can't Be Done from Washington; It Has to Happen at the Local Level, Where Health Care is Delivered



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
And It Cannot Succeed Without Physician Engagement & Leadership



Reducing Costs Without Rationing: Can It Be Done?




Reducing Costs Without Rationing: Prevention and Wellness






Reducing Costs Without Rationing: Avoiding Hospitalizations






Reducing Costs Without Rationing: Efficient, Successful Treatment





Reducing Costs Without Rationing Is Also Quality Improvement!






How Big Are the Opportunities?



5-17% of Hospital Admissions Are Potentially Preventable



Source: AHRQ HCUP



Millions of Preventable Events Harm Patients and Increase Costs


Medical Error	# Errors	Cost Per Error	Total U.S. Cost
Wiedical Elloi	(2008)	EIIOI	10tai 0.5. Cost
Pressure Ulcers	374,964	\$10,288	\$3,857,629,632
Postoperative Infection	252,695	\$14,548	\$3,676,000,000
Complications of Implanted Device	60,380	\$18,771	\$1,133,392,980
Infection Following Injection	8,855	\$78,083	\$691,424,965
Pneumothorax	25,559	\$24,132	\$616,789,788
Central Venous Catheter Infection	7,062	\$83,365	\$588,723,630
Others	773,808	\$11,640	\$9,007,039,005
TOTAL	1,503,323	\$13,019	\$19,571,000,000

3 Adverse Events Every Minute

Source: The Economic Measurement of Medical Errors, Milliman and the Society of Actuaries, 2010



Many Ways to Reduce Tests & Services Without Harming Patients





Instead of Starting With How to Limit Care for Patients...

Contributors to Healthcare Costs

How Do We Limit:

- New Technologies
- Higher-Cost Drugs
- Potentially Life-Saving Treatment



We Should Focus First on How to *Improve* Patient Care

Contributors to Healthcare Costs


How Do We Help:

- Patients Stay Well
- Avoid Preventable Emergencies and Hospitalizations
- EliminateErrors and Safety Problems
- Reduce Costs of Treatment
- Reduce Complications and Readmissions

How Do We Limit

- New Technologies
- Higher-Cost Drugs
- Potentially Life-Saving Treatment

Reducing Costs Without Rationing Reduces Provider Revenues in FFS



Fewer Patients
Fewer Procedures & Admissions
Less Revenue Per Procedure

The Goal Isn't "Creating Incentives," The Goal is *Removing Barriers*

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Lack of Flexibility in FFS

- No payment for phone calls or emails with patients
- No payment to coordinate care among providers
- No payment for nonphysician support services to help patients with self-management
- No flexibility to shift resources across silos (hospital <-> physician, post-acute <->hospital, SNF <-> home health, etc.)

The Goal Isn't "Creating Incentives," The Goal is *Removing Barriers*

Lack of Flexibility in FFS


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- No flexibility to shift resources across silos (hospital <-> physician, post-acute <->hospital, SNF <-> home health, etc.)

Penalty for Quality/Efficiency

- Lower revenues if patients don't make frequent office visits
- Lower revenues for performing fewer tests and procedures
- Lower revenues if infections and complications are prevented instead of treated
- No revenue at all if patients stay healthy



Most "Payment Reforms" Don't Fix The Problems with FFS






If We Want to Reduce Costs Without Rationing...

Reducing Costs without Rationing



We Need Different and Better Ways of Delivering Care






2. We Need New Payment Models That Support Better Care






3. We Need Engaged Patients and a Supportive Benefit Design






4. We Need Good Information to Design and Manage Everything






What Information Do You Need to Reduce Spending w/o Rationing?






Most Breakdowns of Spending Aren't Terribly Useful






Finer Breakdowns Don't Help Much






Even Diagnosis Breakdowns Aren't Terribly Useful






Variations Across Providers May or May Not Indicate Opportunities






Fortunately, We Now Have the Answer






The ACO Will Figure It Out!






The ACO Will Figure It Out! (Somehow)






Most ACOs Assume They'll Need Heavy-Duty Health IT (Big \$\$\$)






And a Lot of Care Coordinators and Utilization Managers (\$\$\$)






Problem #1: Even More Savings Needed to Pay For the New Costs






Problem #2: The *Spending* Is the ACO Members' *Revenue*






And the ACO Can't Succeed If Its Members Don't Succeed






And the ACO Can't Succeed If Its Members Don't Succeed






We Need to Identify the Avoidable Spending






But We Also Have to Pay for What's Not Covered By FFS






Most Healthcare Spending Doesn't Go to Physicians...






...But Physicians Have Significant Influence Over the Other 80%+...






...And the Biggest Savings Are in the Non-Physician Categories






Unnecessary Tests and Procedures






Avoidable ER Visits and Hospitalizations






Avoidable Complications




Inefficiencies in Care Delivery and Use of High-Cost Settings/Supplies






Many Different Opportunities to Reduce Non-Physician Spending






But Lower Spending Can Harm Hospitals and Other Providers






...Unless We Adjust Payments to Adequately Cover Costs






Many Opportunities for Savings, But Also Needs for More Payment





Win-Win: Lower Spending Offsets Higher Payments to Providers





Win-Win: Lower Spending Offsets Higher Payments to Providers

DOESN'T SOMEBODY HAVE TO LOSE?



Win-Win: Lower Spending Offsets Higher Payments to Providers


DOESN'T SOMEBODY HAVE TO LOSE?

WHO IS THAT GOING TO BE?

(BETTER NOT BE ME...)



Example: Reducing Avoidable Procedures





Example: Reducing Avoidable Procedures

		TODAY						
		\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$				
Physician Svcs								
	Evaluations	\$150	300	\$45,000				
	Procedures	\$850	200	\$170,000				
	Subtotal			\$215,000				
Hospital Pmt		\$11,000	200	\$2,200,000				
Total Pmt/Cost				\$2,415,000				

Optional Procedure for a Condition

- Physician evaluates all patients
- Physician performs procedure on 2/3 of evaluated patients
- Up to 10% of procedures may be avoidable through patient choice or alternative treatment



Typical Health Plan Approach: Prior Auth/Utilization Controls

		TODAY				w/ UTILIZATION CTRL				
		\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$		\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$		Chg
Р	hysician Svcs									
	Evaluations	\$150	300	\$45,000		\$150	300	\$45,000		
	Procedures	\$850	200	\$170,000		\$850	180	\$153,000		
	Subtotal		Ι	\$215,000			Γ	\$198,000		
Н	ospital Pmt	\$11,000	200	\$2,200,000		\$11,000	180	\$1,980,000		
Total Pmt/Cost				\$2,415,000				\$2,178,000		-10%



Under FFS, Payer Wins, Physicians and Hospitals Lose

		TODAY				w/ UTILIZATION CTRL				
		\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$		\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$		Chg
P	hysician Svcs									
	Evaluations	\$150	300	\$45,000		\$150	300	\$45,000		
	Procedures	\$850	200	\$170,000		\$850	> 180	\$153,000		
	Subtotal			\$215,000				\$198,000		-8%
Hospital Pmt		\$11,000	200	\$2,200,000		\$11,000	180	\$1,980,000		-10%
Total Pmt/Cost				\$2,415,000				\$2,178,000		-10%



Is There a Better Way?

		TODAY			TC			
	\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$		\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	Ch
Physician Svcs								
Evaluations	\$150	300	\$45,000		?	?	?	
Procedures	\$850	200	\$170,000		?	?	?	
Subtotal			\$215,000				?	
					?	?	?	
Hospital Pmt	\$11,000	200	\$2,200,000		?	?	?	
Total Pmt/Cost			\$2,415,000		?	?	?	



A Better Way: Pay Physicians *Differently*

		TODAY			TC			
		\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	Chg
P	hysician Svcs							
	Evaluations	\$150	300	\$45,000	\$200	300	\$60,000	
	Procedures	\$850	200	\$170,000	\$900	180	\$162,000	
	Subtotal			\$215,000			\$222,000	
Hospital Pmt		\$11,000	200	\$2,200,000	\$11,000	180	\$1,980,000	
Total Pmt/Cost				\$2,415,000			\$2,202,000	

Better Payment for Condition Management

- Physician paid adequately to engage in shared decision making process with patients
- Physician paid adequately for procedures without needing to increase volume of procedures



Physicians Could Be Paid *More* While Still Reducing Total \$

		TODAY			TO			
		\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	Chg
Р	hysician Svcs							
	Evaluations	\$150	300	\$45,000	\$200	300	\$60,000	
	Procedures	\$850	200	\$170,000	\$900	180	\$162,000	
	Subtotal			\$215,000			\$222,000	+3%
Н	ospital Pmt	\$11,000	200	\$2,200,000	\$11,000	180	\$1,980,000	-10%
Total Pmt/Cost				\$2,415,000			\$2,202,000	-9%

Do Hospitals Have to Lose In Order for Physicians To Win?

		•	TODAY			TOMORROW				
		\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$		\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$		Chg
P	hysician Svcs									
	Evaluations	\$150	300	\$45,000		\$200	300	\$60,000		
	Procedures	\$850	200	\$170,000		\$900	180	\$162,000		
	Subtotal			\$215,000	A			\$222,000		+3%
Hospital Pmt		\$11,000	200	\$2,200,000	7	\$11,000	180	\$1,980,000		-10%
Total Pmt/Cost				\$2,415,000	7			\$2,202,000		-9%


Physician Wins Hospital Loses Payer Wins



What Should Matter to Hospitals is *Margin*, Not Revenues (Volume)




Hospital Costs Are Not Proportional to Utilization






Reductions in Utilization Reduce Revenues More Than Costs






Causing Negative Margins for Hospitals





But Spending Can Be Reduced Without Bankrupting Hospitals



Adequacy of Payment Depends On Fixed/Variable Costs & Margins

		•	TODA	Y	TC	MORR	OW	
		\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	Chg
P	hysician Svcs							
	Evaluations	\$150	300	\$45,000	\$200	300	\$60,000	
	Procedures	\$850	200	\$170,000	\$900	180	\$162,000	
	Subtotal			\$215,000			\$222,000	+3%
Н	ospital Pmt							
_	Fixed Costs	\$7,150	65%	\$1,430,000				
	Variable Costs	\$3,300	30%	\$660,000				
	Margin	\$550	5%	\$110,000				
	Subtotal	\$11,000	200	\$2,200,000				
T	otal Pmt/Cost			\$2,415,000				



Now, if the Number of Procedures is Reduced...

	•	TODA	Y	тс	MORF	ROW	
	\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	Chg
Physician Svcs							
Evaluations	\$150	300	\$45,000	\$200	300	\$60,000	
Procedures	\$850	200	\$170,000	\$900	180	\$162,000	
Subtotal			\$215,000			\$222,000	+3%
Hospital Pmt							
Fixed Costs	\$7,150	65%	\$1,430,000				
Variable Costs	\$3,300	30%	\$660,000				
Margin	\$550	5%	\$110,000				
Subtotal	\$11,000	200	\$2,200,000		→ 180		
Total Pmt/Cost			\$2,415,000			ayment Reform www.CHQ	PR ora 79



...Fixed Costs Will Remain the Same (in the Short Run)...

		TODA	Y	тс	MORF	ROW	
	\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	Chg
Physician Svcs	3						
Evaluations	\$150	300	\$45,000	\$200	300	\$60,000	
Procedures	\$850	200	\$170,000	\$900	180	\$162,000	
Subtotal			\$215,000			\$222,000	+3%
Hospital Pmt							
Fixed Costs	\$7,150	65%	\$1,430,000			\$1,430,000	-0%
Variable Cost	s \$3,300	30%	\$660,000				
Margin	\$550	5%	\$110,000				
Subtotal	\$11,000	200	\$2,200,000		180		
Total Pmt/Cost			\$2,415,000				90



...Variable Costs Will Go Down in Proportion to Procedures...

		•	TODA	Y		тс	MORF	ROW	
		\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$		\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	Chg
Physician S	vcs								
Evaluation	S	\$150	300	\$45,000		\$200	300	\$60,000	
Procedure	S	\$850	200	\$170,000		\$900	180	\$162,000	
Subtotal			Ι	\$215,000				\$222,000	+3%
Hospital Pm	ıt								
Fixed Cost	ts	\$7,150	65%	\$1,430,000				\$1,430,000	-0%
Variable C	osts	\$3,300	30%	\$660,000		\$3,300		\$594,000	-10%
Margin		\$550	5%	\$110,000					
Subtotal		\$11,000	200	\$2,200,000			180		
Total Pmt/Co	ost			\$2,415,000	1				91



HOPR ...And Even With a Higher Margin for the Hospital...

		TODA	Y	TC	MORF	ROW	
	\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	Chg
Physician Svcs							
Evaluations	\$150	300	\$45,000	\$200	300	\$60,000	
Procedures	\$850	200	\$170,000	\$900	180	\$162,000	
Subtotal			\$215,000			\$222,000	+3%
Hospital Pmt							
Fixed Costs	\$7,150	65%	\$1,430,000			\$1,430,000	-0%
Variable Costs	\$3,300	30%	\$660,000			\$594,000	-10%
Margin	\$550	5%	\$110,000		→	\$113,000	+3%
Subtotal	\$11,000	200	\$2,200,000		180		
Total Pmt/Cost			\$2,415,000				



...The Hospital Gets Less Total Revenue (But More Per Case)...

		TODA	Y		TC	MORF	ROW	
	\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$		\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	Chg
Physician Svcs								
Evaluations	\$150	300	\$45,000		\$200	300	\$60,000	
Procedures	\$850	200	\$170,000		\$900	180	\$162,000	
Subtotal			\$215,000				\$222,000	+3%
Hospital Pmt								
Fixed Costs	\$7,150	65%	\$1,430,000		\$7,944		\$1,430,000	-0%
Variable Costs	\$3,300	30%	\$660,000		\$3,300		\$594,000	-10%
Margin	\$550	5%	\$110,000		\$628		\$113,000	+3%
Subtotal	\$11,000	200	\$2,200,000		\$11,872	180	\$2,137,000	-3%
Total Pmt/Cost			\$2,415,000	1				

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...And The Payer Still Saves Money

				 I	T.		2014/	
		TODA	Y	i '	10	OMORF	ROW	
	\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	ĺ	\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	Chg
Physician Svcs				1				
Evaluations	\$150	300	\$45,000	1	\$200	300	\$60,000	
Procedures	\$850	200	\$170,000	İ	\$900	180	\$162,000	
Subtotal			\$215,000	ĺ			\$222,000	+3%
	!			ĺ				
Hospital Pmt	1			 				
Fixed Costs	\$7,150	65%	\$1,430,000	 	\$7,944		\$1,430,000	-0%
Variable Costs	\$3,300	30%	\$660,000	 	\$3,300		\$594,000	-10%
Margin	\$550	5%	\$110,000	 	\$628		\$113,000	+3%
Subtotal	\$11,000	200	\$2,200,000	 	\$11,872	180	\$2,137,000	-3%
	!			 				
Total Pmt/Cost	,		\$2,415,000	ĺ		<	\$2,359,000	-2%



I.e., Win-Win-Win for Physician, Hospital, and Payer

	1		TODA	Y		TC	MORF	ROW	
		\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$		\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	Chg
P	hysician Svcs								
	Evaluations	\$150	300	\$45,000		\$200	300	\$60,000	
	Procedures	\$850	200	\$170,000		\$900	180	\$162,000	
	Subtotal			\$215,000				\$222.090	+3%
					F	Physician	Wins		
Н	lospital Pmt					Hospital	Wins		
	Fixed Costs	\$7,150	65%	\$1,430,000		Payer	Wins	\$1,430,000	-0%
	Variable Costs	\$3,300	30%	\$660,000		\$3,300	l	\$594,000	-10%
	Margin	\$550	5%	\$110,000		\$628		\$113,000	+3%
	Subtotal	\$11,000	200	\$2,200,000		\$11,872	180	\$2,137,000	-3%
To	otal Pmt/Cost			\$2,415,000				\$2,359,000	-2%

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I.e., Win-Win-Win for Physician, Hospital, and Payer

		TODA	Y	TC	MORF	ROW	
	\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	Chg
Physician Svcs							
Evaluations	\$150	300	\$45,000	\$200	300	\$60,000	
Procedures	\$850	200	\$170,000	\$900	180	\$162,000	
Subtotal			\$215,000			\$222.090	+3%
HOSD			e phy			going ay??	-0%
Variable Costs	\$3,300	30%	\$660,000	\$3,300		\$594,000	-10%
Margin	\$550	5%	\$110,000	\$628		\$113,000	+3%
Subtotal	\$11,000	200	\$2,200,000	\$11,872	180	\$2,137,000	-3%
Total Pmt/Cost			\$2,415,000			\$2,359,000	-2%



If The Physician Can Reduce the Hospital's Costs Per Procedure....

		•	TODA	Y	тс	MORF	ROW	
		\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	Chg
P	hysician Svcs							
	Evaluations	\$150	300	\$45,000				
	Procedures	\$850	200	\$170,000				
	Subtotal			\$215,000				
H	lospital Pmt							
	Fixed Costs	\$7,150	65%	\$1,430,000			\$1,430,000	
	Variable Costs	\$3,300	30%	\$660,000	\$2,000		\$360,000	-46%
	Margin	\$550	5%	\$110,000				
	Subtotal	\$11,000	200	\$2,200,000		180		
T	otal Pmt/Cost			\$2,415,000				




Everyone Can Win Even More

	•	TODA	Y	ТС	MORF	ROW	
	\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	Chg
Physician Svcs							
Evaluations	\$150	300	\$45,000	 \$830	300	\$249,000	
Procedures	\$850	200	\$170,000	→ \$1,000	180	\$180,000	
Subtotal			\$215,000			\$429,000	100%
Hospital Pmt							
Fixed Costs	\$7,150	65%	\$1,430,000			\$1,430,000	
Variable Costs	\$3,300	30%	\$660,000	\$2,000		\$360,000	
Margin	\$550	5%	\$110,000	\$672)	\$121,000	+10%
Subtotal	\$11,000	200	\$2,200,000		180	\$1,911,000	-13%
Total Pmt/Cost			\$2,415,000			\$2,340,000	-3%


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\$2,200 Variation in Average Cost of Drug-Eluting Stents in CA Hospitals



Source: Coronary Angioplasty with Drug Eluting Stents: Device Costs, Hospital Costs, and Insurance Payments, Emma L. Dolan and James C. Robinson Berkeley Center for Health Technology, September 2010


\$8,000 Variation in Avg Costs of Joint Implants Across CA Hospitals



Source: Implantable Medical Devices for Hip Replacement Surgery: Economic Implications for California Hospitals, Emma L. Dolan and James C. Robinson, Berkeley Center for Health Technology, May 2010



\$16,000 Variation in Avg Costs of Defibrillators Across CA Hospitals



Source: Pacemaker and Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillator Implant Procedures in California Hospitals, James C. Robinson and Emma L. Dolan, Berkeley Center for Health Technology, 2010



Not Just Devices: Other Savings Opportunities From Bundling

- Better scheduling of scarce resources (e.g., surgery suites) to reduce both underutilization & overtime
- Coordination among multiple physicians and departments to avoid duplication and conflicts in scheduling
- Standardization of equipment and supplies to facilitate bulk purchasing
- Less wastage of expensive supplies
- Reduced length of stay
- Etc.



A More Balanced Distribution

	•	TODA	Y	ТС	MORF	₹OW	
	\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	Chg
Physician Svcs							
Evaluations	\$150	300	\$45,000	→ \$350	300	\$105,000	
Procedures	\$850	200	\$170,000	\$950	180	\$171,000	
Subtotal			\$215,000			\$276,00	+28%
Hospital Pmt							
Fixed Costs	\$7,150	65%	\$1,430,000			\$1,430,000	
Variable Costs	\$3,300	30%	\$660,000	\$2,000		\$360,000	
Margin	\$550	5%	\$110,000	\$672		\$121,000	+10%
Subtotal	\$11,000	200	\$2,200,000		180	\$1,911,000	-13%
Total Pmt/Cost			\$2,415,000			\$2,187,000	-9%

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What Payment Model Supports This Win-Win-Win Approach?

		TODAY			TOMORROW				
		\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$		Chg
Physician Svcs									
	Evaluations	\$150	300	\$45,000	\$350	300	\$105,000		
	Procedures	\$850	200	\$170,000	\$950	180	\$171,000		
	Subtotal			\$215,000			\$276,000		+28%
Н	ospital Pmt								
	Fixed Costs	\$7,150	65%	\$1,430,000			\$1,430,000		
	Variable Costs	\$3,300	30%	\$660,000	\$2,000		\$360,000		
	Margin	\$550	5%	\$110,000	\$672		\$121,000		+10%
	Subtotal	\$11,000	200	\$2,200,000		180	\$1,911,000		-13%
T	otal Pmt/Cost			\$2,415,000			\$2,187,000		-9%



Pay Based on the Patient's Condition, Not on the Procedure

		TODAY			TOMORROW				
		\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$		Chg
Physician Svcs									
	Evaluations	\$150	300	\$45,000	\$350	300	\$105,000		
	Procedures	\$850	200	\$170,000	\$950	180	\$171,000		
	Subtotal			\$215,000			\$276,000		+28%
Н	ospital Pmt								
	Fixed Costs	\$7,150	65%	\$1,430,000			\$1,430,000		
	Variable Costs	\$3,300	30%	\$660,000	\$2,000		\$360,000		
	Margin	\$550	5%	\$110,000	\$672		\$121,000		+10%
	Subtotal	\$11,000	200	\$2,200,000		180	\$1,911,000		-13%
T	otal Pmt/Cost	\$8,050	300	\$2,415,000			\$2,187,000		-9%

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Plan to Offer Care of the Condition at a Lower Cost Per Patient

		•	TODAY			TOMORROW				
		\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$		\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$		Chg
Physician Svcs										
	Evaluations	\$150	300	\$45,000		\$350	300	\$105,000		
	Procedures	\$850	200	\$170,000		\$950	180	\$171,000		
	Subtotal			\$215,000				\$276,000		+28%
Н	ospital Pmt									
	Fixed Costs	\$7,150	65%	\$1,430,000				\$1,430,000		
	Variable Costs	\$3,300	30%	\$660,000		\$2,000		\$360,000		
	Margin	\$550	5%	\$110,000		\$672		\$121,000		+10%
	Subtotal	\$11,000	200	\$2,200,000			180	\$1,911,000		-13%
Total Pmt/Cost		\$8,050	300	\$ 2,415,000	>	\$7,290	300	\$2,187,000		-9%



Use the Payment as a Budget to Redesign Care...

	•	TODAY			TC	MORF	ROW	
	\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$		\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	Chg
Physician Svcs								
Evaluations	\$150	300	\$45,000		\$350	300	\$105,000	
Procedures	\$850	200	\$170,000		\$950	180	\$171,000	
Subtotal			\$215,000				\$276,000	\ \ <u>\</u> 28%
Hospital Pmt								
Fixed Costs	\$7,150	65%	\$1,430,000				\$1,430,000	
Variable Costs	\$3,300	30%	\$660,000		\$2,000		\$360,000	
Margin	\$550	5%	\$110,000		\$672		\$121,000	+10%
Subtotal	\$11,000	200	\$2,200,000			180	\$1,911,000	13%
Total Pmt/Cost	\$8,050	300	\$2,415,000		\$7,290	300	\$2,187,000	-9%



...And Let the Providers Decide How They Should Be Paid

		TODAY			TC	ROW			
		\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	Ch	g
Physician Svcs									
	Evaluations	\$150	300	\$45,000	\$350	300	\$105,000		
	Procedures	\$850	200	\$170,000	\$950	180	\$171,000		
	Subtotal			\$215,000			\$276,000	\ -28	%
Н	ospital Pmt								
	Fixed Costs	\$7,150	65%	\$1,430,000			\$1,430,000		
	Variable Costs	\$3,300	30%	\$660,000	\$2,000	K	7 \$360,000		
	Margin	\$550	5%	\$110,000	\$672	R	\$121,000	+10	%
	Subtotal	\$11,000	200	\$2,200,000		180	\$1,911,000	13	%
T	otal Pmt/Cost	\$8,050	300	\$2,415,000	\$7,290	300	\$2,187,000	-9	% 98



Would "Shared Savings" Achieve the Same Thing?



Same Example As Before...

	Year 0
Physician Svcs	
Evaluations	\$45,000
Procedures	\$170,000
Subtotal	\$215,000
Hospital Pmt	
Procedures	\$2,200,000
Subtotal	\$2,200,000
Total Pmt/Cost	\$2,415,000
Savings	

# Patients	\$/Patient
300	\$150
200	\$850
200	\$11,000

Optional Procedure for a Condition

- Physician evaluates all patients
- Physician performs procedure on 2/3 of evaluated patients
- Up to 10% of procedures may be avoidable through patient choice or alternative treatment

Year 1: Physicians & Hospitals Both Lose With Fewer Procedures

	Year 0	Year 1	Chg
Physician Svcs			
Evaluations	\$45,000	\$45,000	
Procedures -	\$170,000	\$153,000	
		\$0	
Subtotal	\$215,000	\$198,000	-8%
Hospital Pmt			
Procedures	\$2,200,000	\$1,980,000	
Subtotal	\$2,200,000	\$1,980,000	-10%
Total Pmt/Cost	\$2,415,000	\$2,178,000	-10%
Savings		\$237,000	

Reduce Procs by 10%

Year 1: Lower Revenue for Docs & Hospital

Year 2: Losses Are Lower If Shared Savings Are Paid...

		Year 0	Year 1	Chg	Year 2	Chg
PI	hysician Svcs					
	Evaluations	\$45,000	\$45,000		\$45,000	
	Procedures	\$170,000	\$153,000		\$153,000	
	Shared Savings		\$0		\$17,000	
	Subtotal	\$215,000	\$198,000	-8%	/ \$215,000	-0%
H	ospital Pmt					
	Procedures	\$2,200,000	\$1,980,000		\$1,980,000	
	Shared Savings		\$0		\$101,500	
	Subtotal	\$2,200,000	\$1,980,000	-10%	\$2,081,500	-6%
To	otal Pmt/Cost	\$2,415,000	\$2,178,000	-10%	\$2,296,500	-5%
Sa	avings		\$237,000		→ \$118,500	

Reduce Procs by 10%

Year 1:
Lower
Revenue
for
Docs &
Hospital

Year 2: Shared Savings Offsets Some Losses

But Physicians and Hospitals Still Have Net 2-Year Losses

	Year 0	Year 1	Chg	Year 2	Chg	Cumulative
Physician Svcs						
Evaluations	\$45,000	\$45,000		\$45,000		
Procedures	\$170,000	\$153,000		\$153,000		
Shared Savings		\$0		\$17,000		
Subtotal	\$215,000	\$198,000	-8%	\$215,000	-0%	-\$17,000
			/			-4%
Hospital Pmt						
Procedures	\$2,200,000	\$1,980,000		\$1,980,000		
Shared Savings		\$0		\$101,500		
Subtotal	\$2,200,000	\$1,980,000	-10%	\$2,081,500	-5%	-\$338,500
						-8%
Total Pmt/Cost	\$2,415,000	\$2,178,000	-10%	\$2,296,500	-5%	\$355,500
Savings		\$237,000		→ \$118,500		-7%



Physician Unlikely to Get Shared Savings If Hospital is First in Line

	Year 0	Year 1	Chg	Year 2	Chg	Cumulative
Physician Svcs						
Evaluations	\$45,000	\$45,000		\$45,000		
Surgeries	\$170,000	\$153,000		\$153,000		
Shared Savings		\$0		\$0		
Subtotal	\$215,000	\$198,000	-8%	\$198,000	-8%	-\$34,000
			/			-8%
Hospital Pmt						
Surgeries	\$2,200,000	\$1,980,000		\$1,980,000		
Shared Savings		\$0		\$118,500		
Subtotal	\$2,200,000	\$1,980,000	-10%	\$2,098,500	-5%	-\$321,500
						-7%
Total Pmt/Cost	\$2,415,000	\$2,178,000	-10%	\$2,296,500	-5%	\$355,500
Savings		\$237,000		> \$118,500		-7%



It's Even Worse Than That...

- There is no shared savings payment at all if a minimum total savings level is not reached
 - With 10,000 Medicare beneficiaries and ~\$100 million annual spending, \$237,000 is only 0.2% savings, not 3.0% required by Medicare, so no shared savings payment would be made
 - If spending increases elsewhere in the ACO, it may offset savings here, leaving nothing to be shared with physicians or hospital
- If there is a shared savings payment, it's reduced if quality thresholds aren't met, even if the quality measures have nothing to do with where savings occurred
- The shared savings payment ends at the end of the 3-year contract period, even if utilization remains lower, and the payer keeps 100% of the savings in future years



So Why Do Payers Like The Shared Savings Model So Much??

It's easy for them to implement:

- No changes in underlying fee for service payment and no costs to change claims payment system
- Additional payments only made if savings are achieved
- The payer sets the rules as to how "savings" are calculated
- Shared savings payments are made well after savings are achieved, helping the payers' cash flow
- All of the savings goes back to the payer after the end of the shared savings contract



Four Things Needed For Win-Win-Win Solutions



Four Things Needed For Win-Win-Win Solutions

1. Defining the Change in Care Delivery

How can the physician, hospital, or other provider change the way care is delivered to reduce costs without harming patients?



Best Way to Find Savings Opportunities? Ask Physicians

"I have zero control over utilization or studies ordered.

I don't get paid for calling a referring doctor and telling him/her the imaging test is worthless."

Radiologist in Maine

"I strongly suspect overutilization of abdominal CT scans in the ER and in the hospital; CT scans lead to further CT scans to follow up lung and adrenal nodules. The hospital focuses on length of stay, but never looks at appropriateness of radiologic studies."

Internist at AMA HOD Meeting

"Patients often need to be in extended care to receive antibiotics because Medicare doesn't pay for home IV therapy. Patient stays in the hospital for 3 days to justify a nursing home/rehab stay."

Orthopedist at AMA HOD Meeting

"I do many unnecessary colonoscopies on young men. Give every PCP an anuscope to allow diagnosis of bleeding hemorrhoids in the office."

Gastroenterologist in Maine



Four Things Needed For Win-Win-Win Solutions

1. Defining the Change in Care Delivery

— How can the physician, hospital, or other provider change the way care is delivered to reduce costs without harming patients?

2. Analyzing Expected Costs and Savings

- What will there be less of, and how much does that save?
- What will there be more of, and how much does that cost?
- Will the savings offset the costs on average?
- How much variation in costs and savings is likely?



A Critical Element is Shared, Trusted Data

- Physician/Hospital need to know the current utilization and costs for their patients to know whether the condition-based or episode payment amount will cover the costs of delivering effective care to the patients
- Purchaser/Payer needs to know the current utilization and costs to know whether the condition-based or episode payment amount is a better deal than they have today
- Both sets of data have to match in order for providers and payers to agree on the new approach!



Four Things Needed For Win-Win-Win Solutions

1. Defining the Change in Care Delivery

— How can the physician, hospital, or other provider change the way care is delivered to reduce costs without harming patients?

2. Analyzing Expected Costs and Savings

- What will there be less of, and how much does that save?
- What will there be more of, and how much does that cost?
- Will the savings offset the costs on average?
- How much variation in costs and savings is likely?

3. Designing a Payment Model That Supports Change

- Flexibility to change the way care is delivered
- Accountability for costs and quality/outcomes related to care
- Adequate payment to cover lowest-achievable costs
- Protection for the provider from insurance risk



Accountable Payment Models Provide Flexibility + Accountability

BUILDING BLOCKS	HOW IT WORKS
Bundled Payment	Single payment to 2+ providers who are now paid separately (e.g., hospital+physician)
Warrantied Payment	Higher payment for quality care, no extra payment for correcting preventable errors and complications
Condition- Based Payment	Payment based on the patient's condition, rather than on the procedure used



Accountable Payment Models Allow Win-Win-Win Approaches

BUILDING BLOCKS	HOW IT WORKS	HOW PHYSICIANS AND HOSPITALS CAN BENEFIT	HOW PAYERS CAN BENEFIT
Bundled Payment	Single payment to 2+ providers who are now paid separately (e.g., hospital+physician)	Higher payment for physicians if they reduce costs paid by hospitals	Physician and hospital offer a lower total price to Medicare or health plan than today
Warrantied Payment	Higher payment for quality care, no extra payment for correcting preventable errors and complications	Higher payment for physicians and hospitals with low rates of infections and complications	Medicare or health plan no longer pays more for high rates of infections or complications
Condition- Based Payment	Payment based on the patient's condition, rather than on the procedure used	No loss of payment for physicians and hospitals using fewer tests and procedures	Medicare or health plan no longer pays more for unnecessary procedures



Opportunities and Solutions Vary By Specialty


	Opportunities to Improve Care and Reduce Cost	Barriers in Current Payment System	Solutions via Accountable Payment Models
Cardiology	 Use less invasive and expensive procedures when appropriate 	 Payment is based on which procedure is used, not the outcome for the patient 	 Condition-based payment covering CABG, PCI, or medication management
Orthopedic Surgery	 Reduce infections and complications Use less expensive post-acute care following surgery 	 No flexibility to increase inpatient services to reduce complications & post-acute care 	 Episode payment for hospital and post-acute care costs with warranty
Psychiatry	Reduce ER visits and admissions for patients with depression and chronic disease	 No payment for phone consults with PCPs No payment for RN care managers 	 Joint condition- based payment to PCP and psychiatrist
OB/GYN	 Reduce use of elective C-sections Reduce early deliveries and use of NICU 	Similar/lower payment for vaginal deliveries	Condition-based payment for total cost of delivery in low-risk pregnancy



Examples from Other Specialties

	Opportunities to Improve Care and Reduce Cost	Barriers in Current Payment System	Solutions via Accountable Payment Models
Neurology	 Avoid unnecessary hospitalizations for epilepsy patients Reduce strokes and heart attacks after TIA 	 No flexibility to spend more on preventive care No payment to coordinate w/ cardio 	 Condition-based payment for epilepsy Episode or condition-based payment for TIA
Gastroenterology	 Reduce unnecessary colonoscopies and colon cancer Reduce ER/admits for inflammatory bowel d. 	 No flexibility to focus extra resources on highest-risk patients No flexibility to spend more on care mgt 	 Population-based payment for colon cancer screening Condition-based pmt for IBD
Oncology	 Reduce ER visits and admissions for dehydration Reduce anti-emetic drug costs 	 No flexibility to spend more on preventive care Payment based on office visits, not outcomes 	 Condition-based payment including non-oncolytic Rx and ED/hospital utilization
Radiology	 Reduce use of high-cost imaging Improve diagnostic speed & accuracy 	 Low payment for reading images & penalty for 2x Inability to change inapprop. orders 	 Global payment for imaging costs Partnership in condition-based payments

Accountability Must Be Focused on What Each Specialty Can Influence





Physicians Need Protections From Insurance Risk

- Two Major Types of Risk
 - Insurance Risk: Whether patients will have a health condition
 - The payer/purchaser pays for this today, and should continue to do so
 - Performance Risk: How much it costs to treat that health condition
 - The payer/purchaser pays for this today, but the provider can control it
- How Do You Separate Insurance & Performance Risk?
 - Risk/severity adjustment of payment
 - Risk corridors in case costs were mis-estimated
 - Outlier payments for unusually expensive patients
 - Risk exclusions for some patient populations or situations where costs can't reasonably be controlled by the physician or hospital



Four Things Needed For Win-Win-Win Solutions

1. Defining the Change in Care Delivery

— How can the physician, hospital, or other provider change the way care is delivered to reduce costs without harming patients?

2. Analyzing Expected Costs and Savings

- What will there be less of, and how much does that save?
- What will there be more of, and how much does that cost?
- Will the savings offset the costs on average?
- How much variation in costs and savings is likely?

3. Designing a Payment Model That Supports Change

- Flexibility to change the way care is delivered
- Accountability for costs and quality/outcomes related to care
- Adequate payment to cover lowest-achievable costs
- Protection for the provider from insurance risk

4. Compensating Physicians Appropriately

 Changing payment to the provider organization (physician practice/group/IPA/health system) does not automatically change compensation to physicians



How You Do Create a Successful ACO?

PATIENTS

Heart

Disease

Diabetes


Back Pain

Pregnancy

ACO




Most ACOs Today Aren't Truly *Reinventing Care*






The Right Way: Give Each Patient an Accountable Medical Home...






...With a Medical Neighborhood to Consult With on Complex Cases




Ask Specialists to Be Accountable for Conditions They Manage






That's Building the ACO From the Bottom Up, Not the Top Down






Now the ACO Can Take a Global Payment And Make It Work






And Accountable Pmt Models Can Be the Basis of Compensation





Isn't This Capitation? No – It's Different






Example: BCBS MA Alternative Quality Contract

- Single payment for all costs of care for a population of patients
 - Adjusted up/down annually based on severity of patient conditions
 - Initial payment set based on past expenditures, not arbitrary estimates
 - Provides flexibility to pay for new/different services
 - Bonus paid for high quality care
- Five-year contract
 - Savings for payer achieved by controlling increases in costs
 - Allows provider to reap returns on investment in preventive care, infrastructure
- Broad participation
 - 14 physician groups/health systems participating with over 400,000 patients, including one primary care IPA with 72 physicians
- Positive two year results
 - Higher ambulatory care quality than non-AQC practices, better patient outcomes, lower readmission rates and ER utilization, lower costs

http://www.bluecrossma.com/visitor/about-us/making-quality-health-care-affordable.html

How Many Patients Do You (Really) Need to (Successfully) Manage the Risk of Accountable Payments?

For Most Employees, the Employer is the Insurer, Not a Health Plan



Survey. The Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research and Educational Trust

Source:

Employer Health Benefits


For Self-Funded Employers, The Health Plan is Just a Pass Through

Self-Funded Purchasers Providers Provider Claims




Even Small Employers Are Increasingly Self-Insured

Sources: Employer Health Benefits 2012 Annual Survey. The Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research and Educational Trust: State-Level Trends in Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance. April 2013. State Health Access Data Assistance Center and Robert Mood Johnson Foundation





Most Businesses With 200-1,000 Employees Take Total Cost Risk





The Keys to Managing Risk

How Do Small Employers Manage Self-Insurance Risk?

- They know who their employees are and can estimate spending
- They start with what they spent last year and try to control growth
- They have reserves to cover year-to-year variation
- They purchase stop-loss insurance to cover unusually expensive cases



The Keys to Managing Risk

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- They purchase stop-loss insurance to cover unusually expensive cases

How Would Small Physician Practices/IPAs Manage Risk?

- They need to know who their patients are in order to project spending
- They need to start with last year's payment s and control growth
- They need some reserves to cover year-to-year variation
- They need to purchase stop-loss insurance to cover unusually expensive cases

Building the Capabilities to Manage Accountable Payment Models

CAPABILITY	BARRIER	SOLUTIONS
1. Know who your patients are		
2. Start with last year's spending and control growth		
3. Have reserves to cover year-to-year variation		
4. Purchase stop-loss insurance to cover unusually expensive cases		

Building the Capabilities to Manage Accountable Payment Models

CAPABILITY	BARRIER	SOLUTIONS
1. Know who your patients are	PPO health plans don't require patients to designate PCPs or use a consistent set of physicians for care	
2. Start with last year's spending and control growth		
3. Have reserves to cover year-to-year variation		
4. Purchase stop-loss insurance to cover unusually expensive cases		



The Limited Choices We Give Consumers/Patients Today

ROCK HARD PLACE

CONSUMERS/
PATIENTS CAN
CHANGE OR USE
MULTIPLE
PROVIDERS
AT WILL

CONSUMERS/
PATIENTS ARE
"LOCKED IN"
TO A SINGLE
GATEKEEPER
PROVIDER



Creating a Middle Ground to Support the Medical Home/ACO

ROCK

CONSUMERS/
PATIENTS CAN
CHANGE OR USE
MULTIPLE
PROVIDERS

AT WILL

MIDDLE GROUND

CONSUMERS/
PATIENTS ARE
ENCOURAGED
TO CHOOSE &
USE AN ACO OR
MEDICAL HOME

HARD PLACE

CONSUMERS/
PATIENTS ARE
"LOCKED IN"
TO A SINGLE
GATEKEEPER
PROVIDER

Do Patients Need \$ Incentives Or Better Care to Use an ACO/PCMH?

ROCK

MIDDLE GROUND

HARD PLACE

CONSUMERS/
PATIENTS CAN
CHANGE OR USE
MULTIPLE
PROVIDERS
AT WILL

CONSUMERS/
PATIENTS ARE
ENCOURAGED
TO CHOOSE &
USE AN ACO OR
MEDICAL HOME

CONSUMERS/ PATIENTS ARE "LOCKED IN" TO A SINGLE GATEKEEPER PROVIDER

OPTION 1: Charge patients more for using providers

outside the ACO or medical home

OPTION 2: Give patients high quality, coordinated care

so they will voluntarily choose to designate a

medical home and use the ACO physicians



Will Patients Voluntarily Limit Their Choices?



Do You Have One of These?





Apps Can Only Be Purchased Through the Apple Store





Owners Will Live With a Battery They Can't Replace






Patients Will Limit Choices if They Get Truly Well-Designed Service






Today: Care is Designed Around the Provider, Not the Patient






Today: Many Barriers to Patient Adherence & Care Coordination





Is It Any Wonder The Patients Gravitate to More Convenience?





Or That Employers Are Trying to Create Their Own Systems?



EMERGENCY ROOM

URGENT CARE CENTER

NON-MEDICAL SUPPORT (e.g., weight loss)


PCP OFFICE/ MEDICAL HOME

SPECIALIST OFFICE

LAB FOR TESTING



Flexible Payment Allows More Radical Redesign of Care Delivery



CAPABILITY	BARRIER	SOLUTIONS
1. Know who your patients are	PPO health plans don't require patients to designate PCPs or use a consistent set of physicians for care	Redesign care to be sufficiently patient-friendly that patients will be willing to have physicians coordinate their care
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4. Purchase stop-loss insurance to cover unusually expensive cases		

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2. Start with last year's spending and control growth	Physicians don't have data on past spending in order to identify savings opportunities	Ask employers for their data and engage all specialties in finding ways to redesign care
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4. Purchase stop-loss insurance to cover unusually expensive cases	None – insurance companies offer this and many capitated IPAs and groups buy it	Factor the cost of stop-loss insurance into costs of managing care for patients



Since Most Health Plan Business Is Just a Pass-Through...





...Little Incentive for Health Plans to Support Payment Reforms

Purchaser Payment

Self-Funded Purchasers ASO Health Plan (No Risk)

Providers

Provider Claims

True Payment Reform Means:

- Health plan incurs the costs of implementing new payment models
- Purchaser gains all the savings from reduced utilization and spending (because all claims are passed through)



The Purchaser and Suppliers (Providers) Need to Talk

Self-Funded Purchasers Better Payment and Benefit Structure

Lower Cost, Higher Quality Care

Providers
Willing to
Manage
Costs

Purchasers and Patients "win" if:


- Providers reduce purchasers' costs
- Patients stay healthy and have lower costsharing

Provider "wins" if:

- Patients stay healthy and need less care
- Purchaser pays provider adequately to manage care efficiently



Health Plan Implements Changes Purchasers/Providers Agree On



This All Sounds Really Hard

This All Sounds Really Hard

Can't We Just Keep Doing What We're Doing Today Until We Retire?

The Opportunities to Reduce Costs Without Rationing Are Widely Known

Reducing Hospital Readmissions

Helping Patients with Chronic Disease Stay Out of Hospital

Reducing Overutilization of Outpatient Services

Shifting Preference-Sensitive Care to Lower-Cost Options

Reducing the Cost of Expensive Inpatient Care

The Question is: How Will Payers Get The Savings?

PAYER

?

Reducing Hospital Readmissions

Helping Patients with Chronic Disease Stay Out of Hospital


Reducing Overutilization of Outpatient Services

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


The Payer-Driven Approach to Achieving Savings






The Provider-Driven Approach to Achieving Savings





Very Different Models...





...And Very Different Impacts on Physicians

Managed Fee-for-Service

PAYER

Global Pmt/Budget

- Payer defines how care should be redesigned
- Payer obtains all savings from lower utilization
- 3. Payer decides how much savings to share with provider

- 1. Physicians determine how care should be redesigned
- Provider and Purchaser or Payer agree on adequate price for care and amount of savings for payer
- 3. Providers get to keep any additional savings and to determine how to divide it




Fixing the Sustainable Growth Rate



Who Says Congress and the President Can't Agree?













Request for Input from Stakeholders on Sustainable **Growth Rate Reform**

"Our utlimate goal is for Medicare to pay physicians...in a way that results in high quality, affordable care for seniors. We support identifying Alternative Models...

Senate Finance Committee



THE REPORT FOR PERCAL TRANSPORT		
BUILDING ON SAVINGS IN THE HEALTH CARE LAW		
Binklin care surgicion one quartier of non-in- ment Education quartier bearing some techniques and some Education quarties, and the solid care desired assessment and some desired prosted. To help realize bearing some some desired prosted. To help realize bearing some some contraction of the solid prosted and some some desired and public heads are specially in a significant some significant enhances in the general re- duction and public heads are specially in a significant some significant enhances are significant and some significant enhances are some some significant and efficiencies in the beating since desired more in some significant time of the ACA. The Prosident consistency of the significant significant enhances are sufficient, efficiency, and well. Superskapp of high in supplement time should now have well better and the significant time should now have seed better.	mediatini, newel genetitions who possible quality districts on a set field previousment of the previousment of the previousments, for constantily providing to equality our other to constantinity providing to equality our of constantinity providing to equality our set of the previous model, and now that, the previous model and now that, the previous model and now that the set of the previous model and now that the set of the previous model and now that the set of the previous model and the set of the previous model and the set of the previous set of the se	
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To continue our exemitment to make health care affectable and attengation Medican, Med- tioni, and other health programs, the Budget includes \$405 Millers in health archage over 26 years West health on the ACA by eliminating on- me payments and freed and supporting solvens that heast the outsite of one. It assumptibles that heast the outsite of one. It is sumptible.	ranio consisti from resistanta Summing by daing. The Medicare Psystemi Advisory Commission (BioCWC has determined that these Indiant Biodoxi Ethention (ISEC add-on payments are approximately greater than the additional patient care ands that teaching heaptile experience. This prepared will health those advisorate and	
this without shifting significant risks onto judi- viduals, alasting benefits, or understring the	sers approximately \$11 billion error 10 years.	
tenhanental magaet their programs represent to not Nation's seniors, people with disabilities, and low comes fundless. Those relevant will no be find Medicards solvency by apprecimately four years.	Better Align Payments in Baral Previders with the Cost of Case. Medican nation a num- ber of operate preparate in surround for the unique studion of delivering medical cars to benefici- rias in recal areas. These payments emblate to be reported; however, in question costs, the select	
Encourage Adoption of New Physician Pursuent Noticle, To Adoption is pre-	ments may be greater than necessary to ensure continued across to care. The Budget proposes in	
milital to working with the Congress to reform Mollitary physician payments to provide profice- ntile populates that incomining quality and effi- ciency is a Socialy respectible way. The Advis- sionation suggests a period of payment statistics hastes according to the silver time for the con-	improve the consistency of payments some ra- val hospital types, previde insentions for efficient delivery of care, and eliminate higher than nec- essary triubstructured, sorting approximately \$2 billion over 20 years.	
lating several years to allow time for the sen- tioned development of available accountable pay- ment models. Noth models would strengtup care	Encourage Efficient Post-Arabe Care. Medicare covers acritica to skilled starting	

President's Budget Proposal to Encourage Adoption of New Physician Payment Models
"...The Administration supports ... the continued development of scalable accountable payment models...[to] encourage care coordination, reward practitioners who provide high-quality efficient care, and hold practitioners accountable..."

President's Budget for Fiscal Year 2014. p.37



Fixing the Sustainable Growth Rate

- How much does it cost to repeal the SGR and give small updates to physicians?
 - \$175 billion total for 2014-2023



Fixing the Sustainable Growth Rate

- How much does it cost to repeal the SGR and give small updates to physicians?
 - \$175 billion total for 2014-2023
- How much of a reduction in Medicare spending would be needed to pay for the SGR repeal?
 - 18%
 - **13%**
 - **10%**
 - **7%**
 - 5%
 - 3%
 - 1%



Relatively Small Savings Needed to Repeal the SGR

- How much does it cost to repeal the SGR and give small updates to physicians?
 - \$175 billion total for 2014-2023
- How much of a reduction in Medicare spending would be needed to pay for the SGR repeal?

```
<del>- 18%</del>
```

- 13%

- 10%

70/

- 5%

- 3%

- 1%



But Nobody in DC Believes That Physicians Can/Will Do It

CBO expects that physicians would generally choose to participate in the payment options that offer the largest payments for the services they provide...

CBO expects that most of the alternative payment models that would be adopted under this legislation would increase Medicare spending. CBO's review of numerous Medicare demonstration projects found that very few succeeded in reducing Medicare spending.

CBO expects that the greater influence of providers within the design process specified in H.R. 2810 would lead to smaller savings than would arise from the development and adoption of new approaches through the [current] CMMI process.

Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate for H.R. 2810 (September 13, 2013)

We Have to Stop *Testing* Models & Start Implementing/Evolving Them

The Slow Process the Government Thinks is Possible Without Physician Leadership to Develop Win-Win Approaches

During the 2019-2023 period, CBO anticipates that most spending through the APM mechanism would involve models being tested through demonstrations, because relatively few models would be likely to meet the criteria for operation without first being tested in demonstration programs.

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Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate for H.R. 2810 (September 13, 2013)

A Better Approach With Physician Group Leadership

- Implement accountable models immediately, with narrow risk corridors
- Commit to small savings initially, then control the trend
- Expand the risk corridors over time and adjust the payment amounts to assure win-win-win approaches





How AMGA Members Can Lead


- Tell Congress (and state Medicaid agencies and private purchasers) that you can and will take accountability for controlling healthcare spending – if you have the right payment model and enough time to implement it
- Show how care can be redesigned to improve care for patients without rationing while reducing spending – identify opportunities in all specialties
- Focus on ways to provide at least some savings (or slowing of growth) immediately in addition to longer-term savings
- Create coordinated care that patients will voluntarily use even in PPO structures
- Develop solutions to problems with current payment models
 - Better risk adjustment systems
 - Better ways of measuring accountability for individual specialties
 - Better quality measures
- Design new compensation models for physicians that match the flexibility/accountability of better payment



Learn More About Win-Win-Win Payment and Delivery Reform







Center for Healthcare Quality and Payment Reform

www.PaymentReform.org



For More Information:

Harold D. Miller

President and CEO
Center for Healthcare Quality and Payment Reform


Miller.Harold@GMail.com (412) 803-3650

www.CHQPR.org www.PaymentReform.org

APPENDIX



What's the Patient's Role and Accountability?





highest-value

providers and

services

Benefit Design Changes Are Also Critical to Success

Ability and Ability and Benefit **Payment** Incentives to: **Incentives to:** System Design Improve health Keep patients well Take prescribed Avoid unneeded medications services Allow a provider to Deliver services coordinate care efficiently Choose the Provider Coordinate **Patient**

services with other

providers



Changes Needed in Benefit Designs

 Reduce or eliminate co-pays, co-insurance, and high deductibles for primary care, preventive treatments, and chronic disease maintenance medications



Example: Coordinating Pharmacy & Medical Benefits

Single-minded focus on reducing costs here...




Pharmacy Benefits

Drug Costs

- High copays for brand-names when no generic exists
- Doughnut holes & deductibles

Principal treatment for most chronic diseases involves regular use of maintenance medication

...could result in higher spending on hospitalizations





Changes Needed in Benefit Designs

- Reduce or eliminate co-pays, co-insurance, and high deductibles for primary care, preventive treatments, and chronic disease maintenance medications
- Have patients share the LAST dollar of prices rather than the FIRST dollar to encourage price competition



Where Will You Get Your Knee Replaced?

Knee Joint Replacement



Consumer Share of Surgery Cost

Price #1 \$20,000

Price #2 \$25,000

Price #3 \$30,000



Where Will You Get Your Knee Replaced?

Knee Joint Replacement




Consumer Share of Surgery Cost	Price #1 \$20,000	Price #2 \$25,000	Price #3 \$30,000
\$1,000 Copayment:	\$1,000	\$1,000	\$1,000
10% Coinsurance w/\$2,000 OOP Max:	\$2,000	\$2,000	\$2,000
\$5,000 Deductible:	\$5,000	\$5,000	\$5,000



Where Will You Get Your Knee Replaced?

Knee Joint Replacement



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10% Coinsurance w/\$2,000 OOP Max:	\$2,000	\$2,000	\$2,000
\$5,000 Deductible:	\$5,000	\$5,000	\$5,000
Highest-Value:	\$0	\$5,000	\$10,000



Which Health System or ACO Will You Choose?

Total Annual Cost Per Patient/Member	Health System/ ACO #1 \$6,000	Health System/ ACO #2 \$8,000	Health System/ ACO #3 \$10,000
Consumer Share	\$0	\$2,000	\$4,000

APPENDIX




Not Just Payment *Method*, But Also *Price*

- Changing the payment method removes barriers to reducing costs and may reduce the incentives to increase volume
- But under any payment method, prices may be too high or too low
 - If the price is (too) high, there are no savings and no incentive to transform care
 - If the price is too low, providers will be unable to deliver high-quality care and risk financial disaster




To Set A Fair Price, Start With Existing Costs...






...Set a Payment Level That Is ≤ Expected Costs...






...If All Goes Well, Costs Will Be Lower Than the Payment Level...






...And Both the Payer and Physician Will "Win"






What Everybody Fears: All Won't Go Well (Costs Go Up)






Many Different Reasons Costs May Increase Beyond Payment






Physicians Should NOT Be Expected To Take *Insurance* Risk





Four Mechanisms for Separating Insurance and Performance Risk



APPENDIX

What about Primary Care and Non-Proceduralists?



For the Non-Proceduralists: Reduce Avoidable Hospitalizations

			TODA	Y
		\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$
P	hysician Svcs			
	PCP	\$600	500	\$300,000
M	edication Pmts	\$4,000	500	\$2,000,000
Н	ospitalizations			
	Hospital	\$10,000	250	\$2,500,000
	Specialist	\$400	250	\$100,000
To	otal Pmt (Cost)			\$4,900,000

500 Moderately Severe Chronic Disease Patients

- PCP paid only for periodic office visits
- Patients do not take maintenance medications reliably
- 50% of patients are hospitalized each year for exacerbations
- Specialist only sees patient during hospital admissions



Most Spending Is Not Going to the Physicians

		TODA	Υ	
	\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	
Physician Svcs				
PCP	\$600	500	\$300,000	
Medication Pmts	\$4,000	500	\$2,000,000	Physician Paymer
				8% of Total Spend
Hospitalizations				
Hospital	\$10,000	250	\$2,500,000	
Specialist	\$400	250	\$100,000	
Total Pmt (Cost)			\$4,900,000	



Better Pay for Care Mgt...

			TODAY			TO	ROW			
		\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$		\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	Chg	3
P	hysician Svcs									
	PCP	\$600	500	\$300,000		\$1,200	500	\$600,000	1009	%
	Specialist					\$400	500	\$200,000	1009	%
M	edication Pmts	\$4,000	500	\$2,000,000		\$4,800	500	\$2,400,000	209	%
Н	ospitalizations									
	Hospital	\$10,000	250	\$2,500,000		\$10,000	150	\$1,500,000	-409	%
	Specialist	\$400	250	\$100,000						
To	otal Pmt (Cost)			\$4,900,000				\$4,700,000	-49	%



Better Rx Adherence (Higher Rx Expenses)...

		TODAY			TOMORROW				
		\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$		Chg
P	hysician Svcs								
	PCP	\$600	500	\$300,000	\$1,200	500	\$600,000		100%
	Specialist				\$400	500	\$200,000		100%
N	ledication Pmts	\$4,000	-500	\$2,000,000	\$4,800	500	\$2,400,000		20%
Н	ospitalizations								
	Hospital	\$10,000	250	\$2,500,000	\$10,000	150	\$1,500,000		-40%
	Specialist	\$400	250	\$100,000					
T	otal Pmt (Cost)			\$4,900,000			\$4,700,000		-4%



Fewer Expensive Hospitalizations...

		TODA	Υ	TOMORROW				
	\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$		Ch
Physician Svcs								
PCP	\$600	500	\$300,000	\$1,200	500	\$600,000		100
Specialist				\$400	500	\$200,000		100
Medication Pmts	\$4,000	500	\$2,000,000	\$4,800	500	\$2,400,000		20'
Hospitalizations								
Hospital	\$10,000	250	\$2,500,000	\$10,000	150	\$1,500,000		-40
Specialist	\$400	250	\$100,000					
Total Pmt (Cost)			\$4,900,000			\$4,700,000		-4



Win-Win-Win: Better Care, Higher Physician Pay, Lower Spending

			TODA	Υ
		\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$
PI	hysician Svcs			
	PCP	\$600	500	\$300,000
	Specialist			
M	edication Pmts	\$4,000	500	\$2,000,000
H	ospitalizations			
	Hospital	\$10,000	250	\$2,500,000
	Specialist	\$400	250	\$100,000
To	otal Pmt (Cost)			\$4,900,000

	ROW	TOMORROW								
Chg	Total \$	# Pts	\$/Pt							
100%	\$600,000	500	\$1,200							
100%	\$200,000	500	\$400							
20%	\$2,400,000	500	\$4,800							
-40%	\$1,500,000	150	\$10,000							
-4%	\$4,700,000									



Pay to Manage The Condition To Enable Win-Win-Win Solutions

			TODA	Υ		TOMORROW				
		\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$		\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$		Chg
P	hysician Svcs									
	PCP	\$600	500	\$300,000		\$1,200	500	\$600,000		100%
	Specialist					\$400	50 0	\$200,000	X	107%
M	ledication Pmts	\$4,000	500	\$2,000,000		\$4,800	50α	\$2,400,000		20%
Н	ospitalizations									
	Hospital	\$10,000	250	\$2,500,000		\$10,000	150	\$1,500,000		-40%
	Specialist	\$400	250	\$100,000						
T	otal Pmt (Cost)	\$9,800	500	\$4,900,000	> (\$9,400	500	\$4,700,000		-4%

APPENDIX




We Want to Save Money By Reducing Overuse...

OVERUSE APPROPRIATE USE



...But Without Denying Needed Care





By Definition, Targets for Cost Savings Are Undesirable Services

SOURCE OF COST SAVINGS FROM CARE DELIVERY CHANGE

- Reducing unnecessary procedures
- Reducing unnecessary tests
- Reducing readmissions
- Reducing avoidable ER visits
- Reducing avoidable hospitalizations
- Reducing avoidable complications
- Reducing inefficiencies



But Quality Measures Must Ensure Reductions Don't Go Too *Far*

SOURCE OF COST SAVINGS FROM CARE DELIVERY CHANGE	UNDESIRABLE OUTCOME TO BE MEASURED
 Reducing unnecessary procedures Reducing unnecessary tests Reducing readmissions Reducing avoidable ER visits Reducing avoidable hospitalizations Reducing avoidable complications Reducing inefficiencies 	 Mortality Misdiagnosis Delays in needed care Increases in >30 day readmissions Exacerbation of conditions Delayed complications Avoidance of high-risk patients



You Can't Just Use Whatever Quality Measures Are Available

SOURCE OF COST SAVINGS FROM CARE DELIVERY CHANGE	UNDESIRABLE OUTCOME TO BE MEASURED	
 Reducing unnecessary procedures Reducing unnecessary tests Reducing readmissions Reducing avoidable ER visits Reducing avoidable hospitalizations Reducing avoidable complications Reducing inefficiencies 	 Mortality Misdiagnosis Delays in needed care Increases in >30 day readmissions Exacerbation of conditions Delayed complications Avoidance of high-risk patients 	
	UNRELATED OR INAPPROPRIATE QUALITY MEASURES	
	 Different conditions Different settings Different processes or procedures Different time periods Different outcomes Different patients 	



Or You'll End Up Distracting Providers From The Primary Goal

SOURCE OF COST SAVINGS FROM CARE DELIVERY CHANGE	UNDESIRABLE OUTCOME TO BE MEASURED
 Reducing unnecessary procedures Reducing unnecessary tests Reducing readmissions Reducing avoidable ER visits Reducing avoidable hospitalizations Reducing avoidable complications Reducing inefficiencies 	 Mortality Misdiagnosis Delays in needed care Increases in >30 day readmissions Exacerbation of conditions Delayed complications Avoidance of high-risk patients
UNDESIRABLE IMPACTS OF UNRELATED QUALITY MEASURES	UNRELATED OR INAPPROPRIATE QUALITY MEASURES
 Time and cost to collect data on unrelated/inappropriate measures Time and cost to improve performance on unrelated measures Inappropriate penalties for mis-measured performance 	 Different conditions Different settings Different processes or procedures Different time periods Different outcomes Different patients



It Matters What Exactly Is Happening Inside the Black Box

TODAY TOMORROW

Spending Per Patient

Other Conditions

Mental Illness

Trauma

Brain/Nervous Sys.


Diabetes, Endocrine

Joints & Bones

COPD, Asthma

Cancer

Heart &



Savings

If you don't know how the ACO plans to reduce costs, how do you know what aspects of quality to measure and monitor?

NOTE: Graph is not drawn to scale

APPENDIX



Look at the Specific Conditions Managed by Each Specialty

Total Patients Treated by Specialty Practice
Patients with Other Conditions
Patients Screened for Health Problems
Patients Receiving Acute Procedures
Chronic Disease Patients



Identify the Opportunities to Improve Care and Reduce Cost

Total Patients Treated by Specialty Practice	Opportunities to Improve Care and Reduce Cost	
Patients with Other Conditions		
Patients Screened for Health Problems	 Identify and treat problems at earlier stages at lower cost 	
Patients Receiving Acute Procedures	 Reduce infections and complications Reduce readmits Reduce cost of procedure and/or post-treatment care 	
Chronic Disease Patients	 Prevent avoidable ER visits and hospitalizations Reduce unneeded & duplicate testing 	



Identify the Barriers in the Current Payment System

Total Patients Treated by Specialty Practice	Opportunities to Improve Care and Reduce Cost	Barriers in Current Payment System	
Patients with Other Conditions			
Patients Screened for Health Problems	Identify and treat problems at earlier stages at lower cost	 No payment for proactive outreach to patients 	
Patients Receiving Acute Procedures	 Reduce infections and complications Reduce readmits Reduce cost of procedure and/or post-treatment care 	 Higher pay to treat complications than to prevent them All providers are paid separately 	
Chronic Disease Patients	 Prevent avoidable ER visits and hospitalizations Reduce unneeded & duplicate testing 	 No payment for care management svcs No payment for phone calls with pts or other specialists 	



Using Better Payment Models to Support Redesigned Care

Total Patients Treated by Specialty Practice	Opportunities to Improve Care and Reduce Cost	Barriers in Current Payment System	Solutions via Accountable Payment Models
Patients with Other Conditions			
Patients Screened for Health Problems	 Identify and treat problems at earlier stages at lower cost 	No payment for proactive outreach to patients	Condition-specific capitationRisk-adjusted global payment
Patients Receiving Acute Procedures	 Reduce infections and complications Reduce readmits Reduce cost of procedure and/or post-treatment care 	 Higher pay to treat complications than to prevent them All providers are paid separately 	Bundled paymentWarrantied paymentEpisode payment
Chronic Disease Patients	 Prevent avoidable ER visits and hospitalizations Reduce unneeded & duplicate testing 	 No payment for care management svcs No payment for phone calls with pts or other specialists 	 Condition-based payment PCP medical home Specialty medical home



Example: Gastroenterology

Total Patients Treated by Specialty Practice	Opportunities to Improve Care and Reduce Cost	Barriers in Current Payment System	Solutions via Accountable Payment Models
Patients with Other Conditions			
Hepatitis C Infection	 Identify and treat problems at earlier stages at lower cost 	 No payment for proactive outreach to patients 	 Condition-based payment
Colon Cancer Prevention	 Identify and treat problems at earlier stages at lower cost 	No payment for proactive outreach to patients	Condition-specific capitationRisk-adjusted global payment
Colonoscopy	 Reduce infections and complications Reduce readmits Reduce cost of procedure and/or post-treatment care 	 Higher pay to treat complications than to prevent them All providers are paid separately 	Bundled paymentWarrantied paymentEpisode payment
Inflammatory Bowel Disease	 Prevent avoidable ER visits and hospitalizations Reduce unneeded & duplicate testing 	 No payment for care management svcs No payment for phone calls with pts or other specialists 	Specialty medical homeCondition-based payment