

# Zero Trust & The Flaming Sword of Justice

Dave Lewis, Global Advisory CISO

**Duo Security, Cisco** 


@gattaca





# #WHOAMI

Dave Lewis, Global Advisory CISO





#### Google

#### hackers must





hackers must have tools
hackers must know
hackers must read books
hackers must die
hackers must have apps
hackers must be stopped
why hackers must eject the sjws
ethical hackers must obtain
all hackers must die
movies that hackers must watch

Report inappropriate predictions









# 

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













User and device trust for every application









# OULISSON

## What is Zero Trust?

- Where/how/when trust is decided has changed
- Must continuously verify
- Assume all networks are hostile
- This is not a "rip & replace" conversation



ZTN












#### What is Zero Trust?

- 2004(ish) Jericho Forum
- 2010 John Kindervag, coined term 'Zero Trust'
- 2014 Google BeyondCorp
- 2017 O'Reilly Zero Trust Networks







Evan Gilman & Doug Barth

#### Change in IT Landscape

With a shift to cloud and mobile-first world, a new approach to security is needed.







Cloud

Mobile

Anywhere



#### **Shift to Zero Trust Trends**

Security/IT teams need to enable user access, from any device and anywhere, while preventing breaches.

# Enable Multi- Cloud Access

- Cloud infrastructure
- SaaS apps

#### **Enable BYOD**

- Work from anywhere using personal devices
- Third-parties, contractors, etc.

#### Breach Prevention

- Compromised credentials
- Phishing

# What is BeyondCorp?

- 2014 Google BeyondCorp paper
- 2016 Google BeyondCorp
  - progress update
- 2017 BeyondCorp migration, user experience and lessons learned

#### BeyondCorp

A New Approach to Enterprise Security

RORY WARD AND BETSY BEYER



ory Ward is a site reliability ngineering manager in Google reland. He previously worked r Ireland at Valista, in Silicon

and General Magic, and in Los Angeles at Retix. He has a BSc in computer applications ror yward@google.com



provided documentation for

Google Data Center and Hardware Operations teams. Before moving to New York, Betsy was a lecturer in technical writing at Stanford University. She holds degrees from Stanford and Tulane. bbeyer@google.com


irtually every company today uses firewalls to enforce perimeter security. However, this security model is problematic because, when that perimeter is breached, an attacker has relatively easy access to a company's privileged intranet. As companies adopt mobile and cloud technologies, the perimeter is becoming increasingly difficult to enforce. Google is taking a different approach to network security. We are removing the requirement for a privileged intranet and moving our corporate applications to the Internet.

Since the early days of IT infrastructure, enterprises have used perimeter security to protect and gate access to internal resources. The perimeter security model is often compared to a medieval castle: a fortress with thick walls, surrounded by a moat, with a heavily guarded single point of entry and exit. Anything located outside the wall is considered dangerous, while anything located inside the wall is trusted. Anyone who makes it past the drawbridge has ready access to the resources of the castle.

The perimeter security model works well enough when all employees work exclusively in buildings owned by an enterprise. However, with the advent of a mobile workforce, the surge in the variety of devices used by this workforce, and the growing use of cloud-based services, additional attack vectors have emerged that are stretching the traditional paradigm to the point of redundancy. Key assumptions of this model no longer hold: The perimeter is no longer just the physical location of the enterprise, and what lies inside the perimeter is no longer a blessed and safe place to host personal computing devices and enterprise applications.




#### Traditional perimeter approach



Focus on securing access to the network by inspecting the device.




#### "Zero Trust" approach



Focus on securing access to the application by verifying the user, inspecting the device and context


Coverage for all apps including SaaS apps outside the corporate network.

### The Magic Triad





## How Do You Establish Trust Easily and Effectively?





# Castles Don't Scale





# Don't trust something just because it's on the "inside" of your firewall







## Is the password...password?





## No!! Now go away, or I shall taunt you a second


time!





# Lessons From History

The sack of Rome in 410 AD







Now there's more than enough bear to go around





#### Reducing the Risk

### Threat

Vulnerability Impact

Risk

Attacker can access across the network and have a field day

Intrusion through compromised credentials/ device

Wide scale compromise exfiltration, data corruption or system stoppage

Widespread breach

Policy driven access and device checks reduce attack surface

Trusted access reduces probability of password/ device compromise

If device, user credentials, device check and policy fail - lateral movement limited

Risk mitigated Zero Trust



#### Data Breaches





#### In The News





#### Join us live at DARKReading Interop Tech Library University Video Radio Slideshows

Calendar Black Hat News APP SEC **ANALYTICS** ATTACKS/ CAREERS & IoT MOBILE OPERATION CLOUD **ENDPOINT BREACHES** PEOPLE

#### **APPLICATION SECURITY**

3/12/2019 05:55 PM

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Robert Lemos News

2 COMMENTS **COMMENT NOW** 

Adam D'A don't happ Matthew Sta





#### Citrix Breach Underscores **Password Perils**

Attackers used a short list of passwords to knock on every digital door to find vulnerable systems in the vendor's network.

The recent cyberattack on enterprise technology provider Citrix Systems using a technique known as password spraying highlights a major problem that passwords pose for companies: Users who select weak passwords or reuse their login credentials on different sites expose their organizations to compromise.

On March 8, Citrix posted a statement confirming that the company's internal network had been breached by hackers who had used password spraying, successfully using a short list of passwords on a wide swath of systems to eventually find a digital key that worked. The company began investigating after being contacted by the FBI on March 6, confirming that the attackers

Dec. 4, 2018














Of breaches involve stolen or weak credentials

Of breaches involve compromised devices


## Porous Perimeter











"The perimeter is anywhere an access decision is being made."



#### New Perimeter



**Remote Employees** 



**Cloud Applications** 



**Old Perimeter** 

Traditional Network:
Endpoints, On-site Users,
Servers, Apps





**Personal Devices** 




Vendors & Contractors




**Mobile Devices** 

#### Zero-Trust Model: Focus on Access

Protect organizations by verifying the identity of users and the health of their devices before connecting to the applications they need.







Lets you protect your assets the same way using the same policies, whether they are accessed internally or externally



#### The Summer of Breach 2012

\$\Displaystyle{\Pi}\$ Site Breached	Users Affected	<b>Link</b>	Confirmed
Yahoo	453,000	CNN	Yes
Formspring	420,000	Securityweek	Yes
Phandroid	1,000,000	Securityweek	Yes
Billabong	21,485	IT News AU	Yes
Nvidia	800	PCWorld	Yes
LinkedIn	6,460,000	Globe and Mail	Yes
eHarmony	1,500,000	ZDNet	Yes
Consumerist	TBD	Consumerist	Yes/TBD



#### Been There...








Hades\_ - Eriksson - Akira - Taz r00tBeer Security Team








#### THREE YEARS








#### TWOYEARS









## 178,404,301



#### Meanwhile, In Texas

7,106,429



#### Systems Vulnerable to Eternal Blue

1,233



#### Systems Vulnerable To Heartbleed

18,137



#### Systems Vulnerable to Bluekeep

43,415





## ZTN Value Proposition

- Devaluation of stolen credentials
- Low hanging fruit sours.
- Complicates lateral movement through uniform security policy.
- Attackers have to work that much harder.



## Trusted Access Security, Value Proposition

- Devaluation of stolen credentials
- Low hanging fruit sours.
- Complicates lateral movement through uniform security policy.
- Attackers have to work that much harder.



# **Bastion Hosts** 1001-1111



#### From DMZ To The Soft Chewy Centre





#### Setting Expectations





#### Aspire to a Zero Trust Network







#### A Game of Increments

#### Determining Priorities







How do you stop attacks that use stolen (yet legitimate) credentials?



How do you prevent devices with poor security hygiene from accessing critical apps?




#### Security Best Practices

#### Policies Are Unique to Each User and Device




Verify Your Users

- Strong Authentication
- Intuitive Authentication
- User Risk Assessment



Verify Their Devices

- Up-to-date Devices
- Well-configured Devices
- Managed Devices
- Device Authentication




Protect Every Application

- All Cloud Apps
- All On-Prem Apps
- Consistent End User
   Experience & Security




#### Security Beyond the Perimeter





#### Trusted Users:

- -> Allow only known users
- → Verify identity with strong authentication
- -> Regardless of location
- On every access
- For every application





#### Example: Stolen Credentials




### Attackers must compromise:

- Username
- Password
- 2nd auth factor
- Trusted device




#### Trusted Devices:

- Allow only known devices
- → Distinguish user- vs. corpmanaged
- -> Enforce device hygiene
- -> Regardless of location
- On every access
- -> For every application






#### Protect Sensitive Apps From Risky Devices






#### Example: Devices with Poor Security Hygiene



#### Every Application:

- Cloud-based or on-prem
- Regardless of access location
- For every user
- On every access
- For every device





#### Enforce Policy Based Controls

#### Get Granular


- Block anonymous networks, out-of-date browsers and plugins, and rooted or jailbroken devices
- Require users to enable screen-lock and use U2F or push authentication
- Ensure all systems are up-to-date





#### BeyondCorp Journey leverages existing investments

- Secure VPNs with MFA and device-level hygiene
- Ensure only managed devices can access network or cloud apps leveraging MDM agents
- Easily add protection for cloud apps in addition to your onprem NAC





Note: No agents required

## Zero Trust Shopping List

- Asset Inventory.
- User Management.
- Device Management through uniform security policy.
- Defined Repeatable Process.
- User and Entity Behavior Analytics.
- Network Zone Segmentation.




#### The Authentications Must Flow





## Supply Chain Security





#### Partner Network, Meet The Pentest







22 tcp ssh

#### OpenSSH Version: 5.3

SSH-2.0-OpenSSH\_5.3 Key type: ssh-rsa

Key: AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABIwAAAQEAuMYp6zw6 u5sT6mseXyMvaeXfBSEFgT1izSdNElbAE5AHzWQbS 5tTBmeK/mvMbrSSprP0eISvXtEG8f0n//K/hzvyUV HiEDXwWWfsOvTsNbb34XvKOgPU+NiuYtA2//is8D+ ssdDeMPBtZ4D8MQl40DTctt/5a/6zTwcnCqLCCY8D Fingerprint: 0b:b6:83:c3:a9:e1:c7:94:de:7

#### Kex Algorithms:

diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 diffie-hellman-group1-sha1

#### Server Host Key Algorithms:

ssh-rsa ssh-dss

#### Encryption Algorithms:

aes128-ctr

aes192-ctr

aes256-ctr

arcfour256

arcfour128

aes128-cbc

3des-cbc

blowfish-cbc

cast128-cbc

aes192-cbc

aes256-cbc

arcfour

rijndael-

#### MAC Algorithms:

hmac-md5

hmac-sha1

umac-64@openssh.com

hmac-sha2-256

hmac-sha2-512

hmac-ripemd160

hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com

hmac-sha1-96

hmac-md5-96



CVE-2011-4327

CVE-2010-4755

Note: the device may not be impacted by all of these issues. The vulnerabilities are implied based on the software and version.	
CVE-2011-5000	The ssh_gssapi_parse_ename function in gss-serv.c in OpenSSH 5.8 and earlier, when gssapi-with-mic authentication is enabled, allows remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a large value in a certain length field. NOTE: there may be limited scenarios in which this issue is relevant.
CVE-2016-10708	sshd in OpenSSH before 7.4 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and daemon crash) via an out-of-sequence NEWKEYS message, as demonstrated by Honggfuzz, related to kex.c and packet.c.
CVE-2014-1692	The hash_buffer function in schnorr.c in OpenSSH through 6.4, when Makefile.inc is modified to enable the J-PAKE protocol, does not initialize certain data structures, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger an error condition.

The default configuration of OpenSSH through 6.1 enforces a fixed time limit between establishing a CVE-2010-5107 ing a login, which makes it easier for remote attackers to cause a denial thaustion) by periodically making many new TCP connections.

> 1 sftp-server.c in OpenSSH before 7.6 does not properly prevent write operations in readonly mode, which allows attackers to create zero-length files.


CVE-2010-4478 OpenSSH 5.6 and earlier, when J-PAKE is enabled, does not properly validate the public parameters in the J-PAKE protocol, which allows remote attackers to bypass the need for knowledge of the shared secret, and successfully authenticate, by sending crafted values in each round of the protocol, a related issue to CVE-2010-4252.

CVE-2016-0777 The resend\_bytes function in roaming\_common.c in the client in OpenSSH 5.x, 6.x, and 7.x before 7.1p2 allows remote servers to obtain sensitive information from process memory by requesting transmission of an entire buffer, as demonstrated by reading a private key.

> ssh-keysign.c in ssh-keysign in OpenSSH before 5.8p2 on certain platforms executes ssh-rand-helper with unintended open file descriptors, which allows local users to obtain sensitive key information via the ptrace system call.

The (1) remote\_glob function in sftp-glob.c and the (2) process\_put function in sftp.c in OpenSSH 5.8 and earlier, as used in FreeBSD 7.3 and 8.1, NetBSD 5.0.2, OpenBSD 4.7, and other products, allow remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (CPU and memory consumption) via crafted glob expressions that do not match any pathnames, as demonstrated by glob expressions in CCH EVD STAT requests to an efter dagment a different vulnerability than CVE 2010 2622







### A Better Way Forward

1. LOG IN WITH SMARTPHONE



2. LOCAL DEVICE AUTHENTICATION




3. COMPLETE






## Webauthn

#### **Biometric Authentication Ecosystem**









#### Zero Trust True-isms

- Assume the network is hostile
- Establish a trust engine
- Reduce threat surface
- Continuously validate for authorization
- KISS




## ZTN Summary

- Build an asset inventory.
- Get a solid hold on user management.
- What's on your network?
- Defined Repeatable Process
- User and Entity Behavior Analytics.
- Network Zone Segmentation.




### CTSS: A Mishap

System Password File became the Message-of-Day




## The Sword Is Dissolving





## No Need For The Holy Hand Grenade






## Thanks For Listening!







# Thanks

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